Retreat from mandatory pension funds in countries of the Eastern and Central Europe in result of financial and fiscal crisis: Causes, effects and recommendations for fiscal rules by Bielawska, Kamila et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Retreat from mandatory pension funds
in countries of the Eastern and Central
Europe in result of financial and fiscal
crisis: Causes, effects and
recommendations for fiscal rules
Kamila Bielawska and Agnieszka Ch lon´-Domin´czak and
Dariusz Stan´ko
Department of Finance, University of Gdan´sk, Institute of Statistics
and Demography, Warsaw School of Economics, Department of
Social Insurance, Warsaw School of Economics
2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/83345/
MPRA Paper No. 83345, posted 22 December 2017 04:32 UTC
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Retreat from mandatory pension funds in countries of the 
Eastern and Central Europe in result of financial and fiscal crisis: 
Causes, effects and recommendations for fiscal rules 
 
 
 
Kamila Bielawska 
Agnieszka Chłoń-Domińczak 
Dariusz Stańko 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Warsaw 2017 
  
  
2 
Authors:  
Kamila Bielawska 
Assistant Professor, Department of Finance, University of Gdańsk, Poland, 
kamila.bielawska@ug.edu.pl  
Agnieszka Chłoń-Domińczak 
Assistant Professor, Institute of Statistics and Demography, Warsaw School of Economics, 
Poland, agnieszka.chlon-dominczak@sgh.waw.pl  
Dariusz Stańko 
Assistant Professor, Department of Social Insurance, Warsaw School of Economics, Poland, 
dariusz.stanko@sgh.waw.pl  
 
 
 
 
Instytut Zarządzania Ryzykiem Społecznym, 2017  
 
 
Research financed from research grant number UMO-2012/05/B/HS4/04206 from the 
National Science Centre in Poland 
 
 
ISBN: 978-83-933991-2-3 
 
 
  
  
3 
Contents 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 7 
Chapter 1: Impact of transition costs related to introduction of pension funds in selected CEE 
countries on their fiscal situation in the years 2008 –2011 ...................................................... 13 
1.1. Pension systems’ features and public finance in the 8 countries .................................. 13 
1.2. Transition cost and their financing – expectations and outcomes ................................ 19 
Chapter 2: Analysis of the functioning of funded parts of the pension system in selected CEE 
countries in the context of the implemented changes .............................................................. 23 
2.1. Development of funded pillars in selected CEE countries ........................................... 23 
2.2. Brief description of asset allocation policy ................................................................... 24 
2.3. Riskiness of portfolios .................................................................................................. 26 
2.4. Rates of returns ............................................................................................................. 28 
2.4.1. Performance in nominal terms ............................................................................... 28 
2.4.2. Performance in real terms ...................................................................................... 29 
2.4.3. Accumulated performance ..................................................................................... 34 
2.4.4. Average longer-term performance in real terms .................................................... 37 
2.5. Investment performance vs economic performance ..................................................... 38 
2.6. Conclusions ................................................................................................................... 46 
Chapter 3: Short-term effects of downsizing pension funds sector in selected CEE countries 
on their public finance situation, and the public pension system ............................................ 48 
3.1. Fiscal position of CEE countries after the crisis ........................................................... 48 
3.2. Financial situation of the PAYG schemes in the CEE countries .................................. 51 
3.3. Quantitative assessment of drivers of after-crisis pension system changes. ................. 53 
Chapter 4: Impact of changes in pension system in selected CEE countries on the level of 
pensions and pension wealth .................................................................................................... 55 
4.1. Changes in expected pensions before and after the crisis in the CEE OECD countries
.............................................................................................................................................. 56 
4.2. The time path of contribution changes in fully funded schemes .................................. 57 
4.3. Method and assumptions for calculation of net change in pension wealth ................... 59 
4.4. Simulation results.......................................................................................................... 61 
4.5. Conclusions ................................................................................................................... 62 
Chapter 5: Long-term impact of changes in mandatory funded systems in selected CEE 
countries on the stability of public finances and pension systems ........................................... 64 
5.1. Ageing and fiscal sustainability on the European Union agenda ................................. 64 
5.2. Projections of pension expenditures based on Ageing Reports .................................... 66 
5.3. Assessment of fiscal sustainability ............................................................................... 71 
5.3. Long-term sustainability gap ........................................................................................ 75 
  
4 
Chapter 6: Recommendations for new fiscal rules: how to balance fiscal considerations with 
the social policy needs? ........................................................................................................... 77 
6. 1. The nature of the fiscal policy rules ............................................................................. 77 
6. 2. Fiscal rules in the EU ................................................................................................... 79 
6.2.1 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union .......................................... 79 
6.2.2 Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) ............................................................................ 80 
6.3. Recommendations for the change of fiscal rules in the EU .......................................... 85 
Chapter 7. Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 88 
References ................................................................................................................................ 92 
Annex. Socio-economic context of pension systems ............................................................... 99 
A.1. Demographic developments. ........................................................................................ 99 
A.2 Labour market ............................................................................................................. 103 
A.3. Pensioners and pension expenditure .......................................................................... 104 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1. 1 Main features of multi-pillar pension schemes in 8 CEE countries ....................... 14 
Table 1. 2. Transition costs (TC) versus general government deficit/surplus (%GDP) .......... 18 
Table 1. 3. Overall level of transition cost between 2001 (or reform start) and 2012, % of 
GDP.......................................................................................................................................... 19 
Table 1. 4 Initial plans for covering transition cost in 8 CEE countries .................................. 20 
 
Table 2. 1 General information on mandatory funded scheme development in 8 CEE 
countries ................................................................................................................................... 24 
Table 2. 2. Asset allocation in shares, bonds and cash and deposits as a percentage of total 
investment portfolio ................................................................................................................. 26 
Table 2. 3. Volatility of nominal returns .................................................................................. 27 
Table 2. 4. Nominal rates of return (%) in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; market-
share weighted averages .......................................................................................................... 30 
Table 2. 5. Nominal rates of return (%) in Hungary*, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, market-
share weighted averages .......................................................................................................... 31 
Table 2. 6. Real rates of return (%) in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; market-share 
weighted averages .................................................................................................................... 32 
Table 2. 7. Real rates of return (%) in Hungary*, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, market-
share weighted averages .......................................................................................................... 33 
Table 2. 8. Accumulated real rates of return (%) in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; 
market-share weighted averages .............................................................................................. 35 
Table 2. 9. Accumulated real rates of return (%) in Hungary*, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, 
market-share weighted averages .............................................................................................. 36 
Table 2. 10. Average annual real rates of return since the inception of the system, end of 2012
.................................................................................................................................................. 37 
Table 2. 11. Excess real return over GDP growth (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) ...... 39 
Table 2. 12. Excess real return over GDP growth (Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia) .... 40 
  
5 
Table 2. 13. Accumulated excess real return over GDP growth (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania)
.................................................................................................................................................. 41 
Table 2. 14. Accumulated excess real return over GDP growth (Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia) .................................................................................................................................. 42 
Table 2. 15. Investment limits in selected CEE funded systems in 2001, 2005 and 2012 ...... 44 
Table 2. 16. Fees in the CEE funded second pillars (in %) – market weighted averages ....... 46 
 
Table 3. 1. Decisions of Council on existing and abrogating excessive deficit procedure in 
2009 – 2015 for CEE countries ................................................................................................ 49 
Table 3. 2. Instruments of fiscal consolidation outside the pension systems during 2009 – 
2012.......................................................................................................................................... 49 
Table 3. 3. Fiscal position of CEE countries in 2007 - 2014 ................................................... 51 
Table 3. 4. Current year deficit/surplus of the PAYG schemes as % of GDP before any 
financial transfers to the system from general government and the deficit/surplus of the 
PAYG schemes less transition costs (in brackets) ................................................................... 52 
Table 3. 5. Results of ANOVA – explanatory variable: general government deficit .............. 53 
Table 3. 6. Results of OLS analysis. Dependent variable: general government deficit .......... 54 
 
Table 4. 1. Gross relative pension level of average wage earner of new entrant to the labour 
market in a given year (% of average wage) ............................................................................ 57 
Table 4. 2. Calculation of additional PAYG pension rights in analysed countries ................. 59 
Table 4. 3. Assumptions on GDP, labour productivity growth, financial market rate of return 
and life expectancy at age 65 in the analysed countries .......................................................... 60 
 
Table 5. 1. General characteristic of S1 and S2 indicators ...................................................... 72 
Table 5. 2. Components of S1 and S2 indicators ..................................................................... 72 
Table 5. 3. S1 values and its components for the CEE countries ............................................ 73 
Table 5. 4. The risk of loss of fiscal stability in the infinite horizon in the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe .................................................................................................................. 74 
Table 5. 5. Fiscal stability of CEE countries according to the preliminary forecasts of the 
2014.......................................................................................................................................... 74 
 
Table 6. 1. Properties of different types of fiscal rules against key objectives ........................ 78 
 
Table 7. 1. Summary: social, economic and fiscal context of pension reform reversals ......... 88 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. 1 Share of old-age pension savings, taxes and debt in transition cost financing in the 
CEE countries from inception of the reform until 2011 .......................................................... 21 
 
Figure 1. 2. Annual decomposition of financing transition costs in the CEE countries .......... 22 
 
Figure 4. 1. Initial and post-2008 fully funded contribution rates in the CEE countries (% of 
wage) ........................................................................................................................................ 58 
Figure 4. 2. Change in the pension wealth due to the post-2008 modification of fully funded 
contribution rates for average wage earners ............................................................................ 61 
 
  
6 
Figure 5. 1. Actual pension expenditure and projected level of pension expenditure in Ageing 
Reports ..................................................................................................................................... 67 
Figure 5. 2. Contribution of the dependency ratio effect to the change in public pension 
expenditure (in p.p. of GDP).................................................................................................... 69 
Figure 5. 3. Contribution of the coverage ratio effect to the change in public pension 
expenditure (in p.p. of GDP).................................................................................................... 70 
Figure 5. 4. Contribution of the benefit ratio effect to the change in public pension 
expenditure (in p.p. of GDP).................................................................................................... 70 
Figure 5. 5. Level of public liabilities ...................................................................................... 76 
 
Figure 6. 1. Simulation of change in the MTO level according to the proposed change (% 
GDP) ........................................................................................................................................ 86 
Figure 6. 2. Simulation of limit of fiscal position at the EDP procedure with transition cost 
fully accounted for (% GDP). .................................................................................................. 87 
 
  
Figure A. 1. Fertility rates in CEE countries, 2000-2011 ...................................................... 100 
Figure A. 2. Average life expectancy at age 65 (total for men and women) ......................... 101 
Figure A. 3. Mobility rates by sending country — mobile EU citizens living in another EU 
Member State, by years of residence (age group 15-64, 2013, in % of working-age population 
of country of citizenship) ....................................................................................................... 102 
Figure A. 4. Current and projected demographic dependency rate (people age 65+ per 100 
people in age 18-64)............................................................................................................... 102 
Figure A. 5. Employment changes in 8 CEE countries, 2000-2011 ...................................... 103 
Figure A. 6 Old-age pension expenditure in CEE countries, 2000-2011 .............................. 104 
Figure A. 7. Changes in the number of old-age pensioners in 8 CEE countries (2007=100).
................................................................................................................................................ 105 
Figure A. 8. Pension contribution revenue in the analysed countries (% of GDP), 2007-2013
................................................................................................................................................ 105 
 
  
  
7 
 
Introduction 
The aim of the project is to assess in various dimensions the causes and effects of the 
reduction of mandatory pension funds in selected countries of Central-Eastern Europe and to 
propose changes to existing fiscal rules so that they could respond to the challenge of 
population ageing impact on public finances
1
. 
The need for reforming public pension systems has been apparent both from the current stage 
of their development and the change in (demographic, economic and social) circumstances in 
which they operate. Maintaining a high level of (in relation to GDP) public spending on 
pensions in the light of ageing populations is not possible, hence one needs to seek solutions 
that would allow states to maintain their solvency to meet pension obligations. 
The debate on the directions of the reform of public pension schemes was initiated by a 
seminal World Bank report of 1994 "Averting the Old Age Crisis" (World Bank, 1994), 
which pointed to the need for introduction of multipillar systems with significant 
participation of mandatory funded pension schemes, that would contribute to the 
diversification of the pension financing in the light of projected demographic change. The 
report triggered various reactions, including some critical opinions (Beattie, McGillivray, 
1995; Singh, 1996). After a period of more emotional than scientific presentations on the 
benefits of the capitalization of pension contributions in the transition to multipillar systems, 
further discourse based on economics appeared in the literature (Orszag, Stiglitz 1999, Barr 
1999).  
The early experiences of (mainly) developing countries, mainly from Latin America and 
Europe and Central Asia that had replaced or supplemented their public systems as well as 
                                                 
1
 We thank experts and institutions that kindly provided us with necessary data. In particular, we are obliged for 
providing us performance data on: Bulgaria (Dimitar Dimitrov, Financial Supervisory Commission; Jeko Milev, 
University of National and World Economy), Latvia (Aiga Jansone, Financial and Capital Market Commission), 
Lithuania (Audrius Šilgalis, The Bank of Lithuania), Estonia (Tönu Lillelaid, Ministry of Finance), Hungary 
(Agnes Matits, Corvinus University and Richard Bense, Central Bank of Hungary), Romania (Michai Bobocea, 
Romanian Pension Funds' Association), Slovakia (Michal Nalevanko, The Benchmark Research and 
Consultancy; Julia Cillikova, Central Bank of Slovakia; Peter Penzes, Central Bank of Slovakia, Jan Sebo, 
Matej Bel University). We would like to thank the participants of the World Bank seminar in April 2014 for 
their comments and suggestions to the early version of this work, in particular to Robert Palacios, Roberto 
Rocha, Asta Zviniene and Sandor Sipos who gave valuable suggestions to our work. We would also like to 
thank participants of the 2014 FISS conference, who provided comments to our research. Maciej Żukowski, 
Kamila Marchewka-Bartkowiak and Robert Palacios provided useful reviews to the final report. All errors 
remain on authors’ responsibility. We also thank Marcin Kawiński from the Warsaw School of Economics for 
his valuable organisational help. 
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further research have significantly increased knowledge and insight regarding pension 
systems. These developments contributed to further conceptual underpinnings for the World 
Bank’s thinking on pension systems and reforms and further reflection on the key design and 
implementation issues presented in (Holzmann, Hinz 2005). The great recession and 
worsening public finance situation in many of the countries that reformed their pensions in 
1990s and at the beginning of the 21
st
 century yet again lead to further considerations on 
political and economic sustainability of the pension reforms.  
From the perspective of the objectives of pension systems specified in the Open Method of 
Co-ordination (OMC) of pension systems in the European Union, the pension system should 
have the following characteristics: to provide benefits, which amounted to prevent poverty 
(adequate), to be possible to be financed by taxpayers (affordable), to be capable of 
functioning in the long term (sustainable) and to be resistant to shocks generated by 
economic, demographic, and political factors (robust). Most of these characteristics have 
been concluded in the Green Paper (EC, 2010) and in the White Paper on Pensions (EC, 
2012). 
In the late 1990s the wave of pension reforms transformed the pension landscape in Central 
and Eastern Europe. The transition from centrally planned to market economies triggered 
societal changes and the significant restructuring of labour markets. Shifts in the structure of 
labour demand increased pressures for early retirement and raised concerns about pension 
system financing. Falling fertility levels and rising life expectancy accentuated population 
ageing. As a result, pension systems faced the challenge of short- and long-term 
sustainability. Many CEE countries introduced structural reforms, shifting towards multi-
pillar systems with fully funded components. 
These reforms were introduced during the 1998 – 2008 by eight countries (Hungary, Poland, 
Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Slovakia and Romania) which become new EU member 
states from this region (in 2004 and 2007 enlargement rounds).  
The introduction of funded components was perceived in many of the countries as a reform 
process that served several purposes. First, with population ageing it seemed that systems that 
relied on labour and financial markets provided better risk diversification (see Chłoń et al., 
1999). Second, with relatively low level of savings and underdeveloped financial markets, the 
introduction of mandatory funding provided a stable instrument that would support the 
development of financial markets. The reformers also anticipated that pension reforms would 
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provide further incentives for structural changes intended to reduce excessive public 
spending.  
The design of the CEE pension systems and the way they were changed was an outcome of a 
country-specific mix of economic, social and political criteria. National policymakers made 
the final decisions, but international institutions frequently influenced the design (Orenstein, 
2008; Chłoń-Domińczak and Mora, 2003) by both providing an input to the pension debate 
through publications and reports, (i.e. World Bank, 1994) and, more directly, through 
financial aid and loans (Orenstein, 2008; Guardiancich, 2013). 
Almost two decades after the pension reforms the EU accession initiated a new wave of 
socio-economic changes, characterised by an increasing role being played by European 
institutions. Experiences from the implementation of the reforms, including the performance 
of pension funds, reopened national discussions on pension systems and their design. The 
2008 financial and economic crisis triggered the second wave of pension system changes. 
Many countries decided to diverge from their initial reform scenario, downscaling or fully 
reversing the development of their funded pension schemes.  
Furthermore, some of the reform results did not meet initial expectations. As Barr and 
Diamond (2010, p.72) point out, the expected reform outcomes are contingent on beneficial 
effects on growth and on country-specific factors, including the institutional capacity: skills 
in allocating pension funds, skills in administering pension accounts and the capacity to 
regulate financial markets. Whether such reforms can be sustained depends also on a 
government’s capacity to maintain the sound public finances necessary to meet long-term 
transition requirements. 
In the years 2008–2011 all of eight CEE countries made changes in the functioning of 
mandatory pension funds by reducing the amount of contributions transferred to the funds or 
changing fund participation rules (Chłoń-Domińczak, 2010; Chłoń-Domińczak, Stańko, 
2011). These actions were a part of the fiscal consolidation undertaken by the countries of 
region due to the need to remove the excessive deficit and reduce government debt growth 
(Bielawska, 2011a). 
Action taken by the governments of CEE countries have significantly reduced – temporarily 
or permanently – the growth of funded pension schemes by reducing the mandatory 
contributions paid into pension funds. These changes have so far been reported mainly from 
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the standpoint of political economy of reform (Guardiancich 2010; Orenstein, 2011; Ghetu 
2011) and the state of public finances, mainly through the disclosed amount of the public debt 
(Velculescu 2011, Jarrett 2011). 
This report is one of the first attempts to determine the impact of these decisions on the 
public sector situation in each country, related to non-pension debt in the context of changed 
fiscal rules  - most importantly, the revised in 2011 Stability and Growth Pact and signed in 
March 2012 fiscal compact. After the EU accession, countries with multi-pillar systems were 
allowed to treat a part of the pension funds’ assets as public finance sector. They could 
deduct this part from the level of general government debt taken into account the Pact. These 
preferences were gradually withdrawn by 2009. As a result, the level of general government 
debt was higher due to the fact that in multi-pillar schemes part of the implicit pension 
liabilities was turned into the explicit public debt. This last issue has already been raised in 
the literature (Bukowski, Chłoń-Domińczak, Góra, 2009; Pater 2011). Also some proposals 
offering a measure of budget balance that takes into account the long-term nature of pension 
obligations have been presented (Soto, Clements, Eich 2011; Velculescu 2011), but have not 
been so far considered in the process of strengthening the fiscal governance within the EU. 
Our research compliments other research in the area, such as (Guardiancich, 2013; Borowski 
et al., 2013; Milos & Milos, 2013; Schwarz & Arias, 2014) and offers some modifications to 
revised in 2011 Stability and Growth Pact. 
In the report we aim to review the changes in the multi-pillar pension systems CEE region: 
Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Romania. All of these 
countries in the course of late 1990s and early 2000s introduced multi-pillar pension systems 
that replaced traditional PAYG ones. All countries are also EU member states and are subject 
to the European policy with regards to the coordination of economic government including 
public finance situation. However, as analysis reveals they have different social and 
economic contexts, relevant from the pension systems’ perspective.  
The project makes a comprehensive assessment of consequences of limiting the role of 
funded pillar in societies’ pension security of selected countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe from macro perspective (public finance) and micro perspective (pension levels of 
individuals), also combining the two approaches. This helped to determine the costs and 
benefits of current developments in the short and long term for various stakeholders. 
  
11 
In the project we applied various research methods such as: desk research of the existing 
literature and statistical data, qualitative methods, including country expert’s information, 
discussion with representatives of the European Commission and the World Bank as well as 
quantitative methods (multivariate statistical analysis, micro simulation models, 
macroeconomic regression models, pension fund performance and risk evaluation methods). 
Our main hypothesis was that the current fiscal rules in the EU do not take into account the 
long-term challenges caused by population aging. 
Hypothesis 1: Rise of the public debt and fiscal deficit in the CEE countries was not 
primarily caused by the costs of financing transition to funded pension systems. 
Hypothesis 2: The way the CEE countries’ governments justified cuts in pension funds 
contributions can threaten the social trust to mandatory pension systems. 
Hypothesis 3: Short-term effects of reduction of contributions to pension funds were positive 
for public finance and did not have a negative impact on pension systems, but may lead to 
increased volatility of financial markets. 
Hypothesis 4: Future pension benefits will be lower due to reduction of contributions 
transferred to mandatory pension funds. 
Hypothesis 5: Future stability of pension systems and public finance will worsen due to 
reduction of contributions to mandatory pension funds. 
Hypothesis 6: A compromise between solving fiscal tensions and maintaining a significant 
role of mandatory funded pillars would have to involve considerable changes in the fiscal 
rules in the EU, the Eurostat classification methods of pension debt and countries’ internal 
public finance laws. 
The report comprises of seven chapters. The first chapter presents the design and changes in 
the multi-pillar pension systems in the CEE countries in the light of their public finance 
situation and broader socio-economic context
2
. Chapter 2 analyses how the pension fund 
markets functioned due to the pension changes introduced recently by the governments. 
Chapter 3 makes an assessment of the short-term effects of reduction of pension funds sectors 
on the public finance situation and the public pension system in each of the analysed 
countries. Chapter 4 analyses the impact of changes in pension system on the level of pension 
wealth of individuals. Chapter 5 provides an assessment of the long-term impact of changes 
in funded systems for the stability of public finances and pension systems. Chapter 6 presents 
the recommendations on how to strike the balance between fiscal tensions and the need to 
                                                 
2
 Broader demographic, labour market and pension system characteristics are presented in the Annex.  
  
12 
maintain the role of pension funds in developing sustainable and adequate pensions in the 
future. The last chapter summarises the findings of the project with regards to the formulated 
hypotheses.  
The authors gratefully acknowledge the financing of this project by the National Science 
Centre, the decision number DEC-2012/05/B/HS4/04206.  
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Chapter 1: Impact of transition costs related to introduction of pension 
funds in selected CEE countries on their fiscal situation in the years 2008 –
2011 
Kamila Bielawska, Agnieszka Chłoń-Domińczak, Dariusz Stańko 
Starting from a descriptive analysis of the functioning of mandatory funded systems in each 
country and a short description of the developments in 2008-2011, we focus on the 
contribution of transition financing to the change in the general government deficit and debt. 
In the analysis we look at the factors that are seen as main reasons for pension reforms, such 
as demographic situation and pension systems’ performance, including revenues and 
expenditures of the pension system and number of pensioners. We also look at the labour 
market situation which influences contribution revenue. Finally, we look into the public 
finance situation: general government expenditure and deficit level.  
Research methods used in this task include:  
 desk research (literature, collection of available data on public finance and 
pension systems situation),  
 qualitative methods: interviews with country experts as well as discussions 
based on presentation of the preliminary results (World Bank seminar, FISS 
conference), 
 descriptive analysis of data including public finance data, pension system 
financing and socio-economic background of the pension systems. 
1.1. Pension systems’ features and public finance in the 8 countries 
 
Despite the common shift towards multi-pillar pension system design there are substantial 
differences between the pension systems of the analysed countries both in terms of their 
design and transition rules (Table 1.1). In parallel to the introduction of mandatory systems, 
the countries also reformed their publicly managed components, either downscaling the 
defined benefit (DB) schemes, introducing point systems or introducing a paradigmatic shift 
to non-financial defined contribution (NDC) schemes. All the countries also decided to 
increase their retirement age and five of them equalised the retirement ages for men and 
women. 
  
14 
Changes to the PAYG parts, including increases to the retirement age, were important 
measures towards reaching the long-term financial sustainability of pension systems and 
generating savings that could cover transition costs. Such costs occur when the prefunding is 
obtained by transferring part of the existing mandatory pension contribution to the PAYG 
scheme to the funded pillar. Only Estonia decided to prefund old-age pensions through a 
partial increase of the mandatory contribution paid by employees. Other countries in the 
region did not use this method due to the relatively high levels tax wedges. As a rule, pension 
reforms were designed to avoid distorting the labour market. To achieve this aim, most of the 
countries chose to reduce the PAYG pillar revenues to build the funded part of the mandatory 
pension system. These decisions had affected the financial situation of PAYG pillar what is 
described in more detail in the Chapter 3.  
Table 1. 1 Main features of multi-pillar pension schemes in 8 CEE countries 
  Public 
pension 
scheme 
(PAYG) 
Retirement age Mandatory Funded Scheme  
Initial 
contributions 
Enactment 
date 
Who participates 
Bulgaria DB 60/55 to 63/60 2% to 5% 2002 Mandatory for all workers 
<42, no cohorts with 
choice option 
Estonia DB 60/55 to 63/63 6% (4% +2%) 2002 Mandatory for new 
entrants, voluntary for 19-
60 in year of reform 
Latvia NDC 60/55 to 62/62 2% to 8% 2001 Mandatory for new and 
workers < 30, voluntary 
for 30-50 
Lithuania DB 60/55 to 62.5/60 2.5% to 5.5% 2004 Voluntary for current and 
new workers 
Hungary DB 60/55 to 62/62 6% to 8% 1998 Mandatory for new 
entrants, voluntary for all 
employed  
Poland NDC 65/60 (60/55) to 
67/67 
7.3% 
 
1999 Mandatory for new and 
workers < 30, voluntary 
for 30-50 
Romania DB 62/57 to  65/60 2% to 3% 2008 Mandatory for new and 
workers < 35, voluntary 
for 36-45 
Slovakia Points 60/53-57 to 
62/62 
9% 2005 Mandatory for born after 
1983, voluntary for all 
being in the social 
insurance before 2005 
Source: Schwarz and Arias (2014) with authors’ update. 
The CEE states applied different transition strategies to the new system. In five countries, the 
part of old-age contribution transferred to the funded scheme was to be increased gradually, 
in three (Estonia, Poland and Slovakia) the contribution level was determined at the very 
beginning. There were also different approaches to the participants in the system. While 
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mandating participation for new entrants to the labour market was common (with the 
exception of Lithuania), some countries decided to cover also part of the current workforce 
(up to the age 42, depending on the country). All countries apart from Bulgaria made the 
system voluntary for some parts of the workforce, in several cases introducing an upper age 
limit (50 years in Latvia and Poland, 45 years in Romania).  
The different strategies applied to the contribution level of the funded pillar, the switching 
rules (Table 1.1), and choices made by employees, influenced the level of transition costs. 
Actual transition costs before the financial crisis ranged from 1.6% of GDP in Poland and 
Hungary (due to high contribution rates, high participation, the longest period from the 
introduction of the reform), through 1.3-1.1 % of GDP in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Slovakia, to 0.8% of GDP in Bulgaria (due to relatively low contribution rates and the 
restriction of participation to specified cohorts) and 0.4% in Romania (due to the lowest 
contribution rates and the shortest period since reform implementation). 
The fiscal effects of transition costs on overall general government deficit/surplus are shown 
in Table 1.2. Fiscal situation prior to financial and economic crisis differed between analysed 
countries. Countries with the highest transition costs (Hungary and Poland) entered pension 
reform having already high public deficits. Both countries did not manage to bring the public 
revenue and expenditures close to balance even in the periods of high economic growth. 
Transition costs were not predominant factor of fiscal imbalance. Fiscal stance of Slovak 
Republic was better, although before and after pension reform implementation the country 
run deficits balancing on the 3% GDP edge for EU member states. 
Baltic States and Bulgaria, had more fiscal space to cover transition costs. Up to 2008 
Bulgaria and Estonia noted surplus in general government sector, which covered at least 
partially contributions diverted to the mandatory pension funds. Latvia and Lithuania were in 
fiscal stance close to balance, so the transition costs did not significantly worsen this 
situation. 
In 2009 fiscal position of CEE countries changed significantly.  This was mostly due to the 
deep economic recession (except Poland). Public deficits exploded to 8-9% of GDP (with 
notable exception of Estonia) and most of the countries decided to permanently reverse or 
reduce the funded pillar of their pension systems as one of the instruments of fiscal 
consolidation. The scale of reduction significantly differed between countries: from 
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sequestration of assets of pension funds and/or total suspension of contribution to pension 
funds by permanent or temporary reduction of contribution to pension funds also 
accompanied by opt-out option. As a result fiscal effects differed between countries (Table 
1.2), with an average of 50% cuts of transition costs within a period of 2008-2012. 
The period of reform implementation allowed for assessment, whether the initial predictions 
occurred. The assessment of independent experts revealed that: 
In many countries with multi-pillar systems (…) investments in privately funded 
pillars are not well diversified, although rates of return are high as a result of 
investments in government bonds. While these bonds offer high returns, they often 
compensate for macroeconomic and investment risk. In addition, privately funded 
systems remained open to political influence, just like PAYG plans, particularly in the 
times of economic crisis. (World Bank, 2006a, p. xxiv).  
While this assessment was made before the hit of the financial and economic crisis, 
developments after 2008 also led to the changes in pension systems. These changes were 
triggered not only by the developments within pension systems, but mainly by 
macroeconomic and fiscal circumstances, which are presented and discussed in further parts 
of the paper. These circumstances also diverted from initial projections, which assumed, 
among others, stable growth of labour market, both in terms of employment levels as well as 
wage growth. Under such assumptions, the transition costs were affordable from the 
perspective of the public finance situation in the reforming countries. The ex-post analysis 
reveals that in reality these expectations were not met.  
In consequence of economic, public finance and pension system developments  after 2008, 
which can be attributed to both external and internal factors, the wave of pension systems 
changes was initiated again, this time leading to reduction funded components or even 
reversals of multi-pillar schemes. Such changes were implemented in seven out of eight 
discussed countries, which is shown in Table 1.5.  
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Table 1.5. Reversals of funded parts of multi-pillar systems in 8 CEE countries 
Country Short description of the change to contributions and assets.  
Bulgaria No change. 
Estonia Temporary reduction with off-set.  
6% contribution rate cut to 0% between June 2009 and January 2011 and 
shifted to PAYG. Gradual increase from 2011. Rate set at 3% in January 
2011 and 6% in January 2012.  In 2014-2017 at 8% to offset missed 
contributions 
Latvia Partial reduction. 
8% contribution rate reduced to 2% in May 2009. Rates increased to 4% 
from 2013 
Lithuania Partial reduction. 
5.5% contribution rate reduced to 2% in July 2009. Rates further lowered 
to 1.5% in January 2012 and 2.5% in 2013. Change to 3% (2%+ 1%) 
January 2014, voluntary participation. Additional contribution at 2% in 
2016-2019. 
Hungary Permanent reversal. 
Contribution rate reduced to 0% in January 2011 assets transferred to the 
mandatory PAYG system. 
Poland Permanent reduction and partial reversal. 
Contribution rate reduced to 2.3% in May 2011. From February 2014 
contribution at 2.92%, in February 2014 assets invested in government 
bonds transferred to PAYG scheme and redeemed. In 2014 system made 
opt-out and opt-in in specified time slots. Assets from FF transferred 
gradually to PAYG 10 years prior to retirement.  
Romania Temporary reduction. 
Reduction in planned growth path of contribution rate from 2% to 6%. Rate 
froze at 2%, started to increase from 2011 at annual rate of 0,5pp. 
Slovakia Permanent reduction. 
9% contribution reduced to 4% in 2013with planned further increase to 6% 
in 2024. Funded scheme opt-out and opt-in system. 
Source: Schwarz and Arias (2014) updated by authors. 
As a result of these policy directions, the future growth of funded systems’ assets will be 
smaller and in turn, financing of future pensions will rely mainly on PAYG pension schemes. 
In two countries, namely Hungary and Poland all or part of assets already accumulated were 
diverted back to the PAYG schemes.  
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Table 1. 2. Transition costs (TC) versus general government deficit/surplus (%GDP)  
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Bulgaria 
  
transition costs (TC)     0.6 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 
GG deficit/surplus     -1.2 -0.4 1.8 1.0 1.8 1.1 1.6 -4.2 -3.2 -2.0 -0.5 
GG balance less TC         -0.6 0.1 2.4 1.7 2.6 2.2 2.7 -3.1 -2.2 -0.9 0.6 
Estonia 
  
transition costs (TC)     0.0 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.5 1.1 0.1 0.4 0.9 
GG deficit /surplus     -0.2 -0.1 0.3 1.7 1.6 2.4 -2.9 -2.0 0.2 1.1 -0.2 
GG balance less TC         -0.2 0.3 0.9 2.4 2.3 3.2 -2.4 -0.9 0.3 1.5 0.7 
Latvia 
  
transition costs (TC)    0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
GG deficit/surplus     -2 -2.2 -1.6 -1.0 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 -4.0 -8.9 -8.2 -3.4 -0.8 
GG balance less TC       -1.9 -2.0 -1.2 -0.6 0.2 0.1 0.4 -2.9 -8.8 -8.1 -3.3 -0.7 
Lithuania 
  
transition costs (TC)       0.3 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.1 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.4 
GG deficit / surplus       -1.5 -0.5 -0.4 -1.0 -3.3 -9.3 -6.9 -9.0 -3.2 
GG balance less TC             -1.2 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 -2.2 -8.7 -6.6 -8.6 -2.8 
Hungary 
  
transition costs (TC) 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.1 0.0 0.0 
GG deficit / surplus -7.5 -5.1 -3 -4.1 -8.9 -7.2 -6.4 -7.9 -9.4 -5.1 -3.7 -4.6 -4.5 -5.5 -2.3 
GG balance less TC -7.3 -4.6 -2.5 -3.6 -8.4 -6.5 -5.6 -6.9 -8.4 -3.9 -2.5 -3.2 -3.4 -5.5 -2.3 
Poland 
  
transition costs (TC)  0.3 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.0 0.5 
GG deficit / surplus  -2.2 -3.0 -4.8 -4.8 -6.1 -5.2 -4.0 -3.6 -1.9 -3.6 -7.3 -7.6 -4.9 -3.7 
GG balance less TC   -1.9 -2.0 -3.7 -3.6 -4.9 -4.1 -2.7 -2.2 -0.5 -2.0 -5.7 -6.0 -3.9 -3.2 
Slovakia 
  
transition costs (TC)        0.6 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 
GG deficit / surplus        -2.9 -3.6 -1.9 -2.4 -7.9 -7.5 -4.1 -4.2 
GG balance less TC               -2.3 -2.5 -0.7 -1.2 -6.7 -6.3 -2.9 -3.1 
Note: Data for Romania is not available. 
Source: data from country experts’ questionnaires, author’s review of Convergence Programmes of CEE countries and Eurostat for general government deficit/surplus.  
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1.2. Transition cost and their financing – expectations and outcomes 
 
Between 2001 or the year when multi-pillar system was introduced, the total level of 
transition cost in relation to GDP (measured as a sum of the value of contributions transferred 
to the pension funds) ranged from 16% of GDP in Poland to 1,6% of GDP in Romania. This 
means that the fiscal effort necessary to meet the transition costs of introducing multi-pillar 
pension reforms differed significantly between countries.  
Table 1. 3. Overall level of transition cost between 2001 (or reform start) and 2012, % of GDP 
Country 
Period Total transition cost 
Poland 
2001-2012 
16.0 
Hungary 
2001-2012 
9.9 
Slovakia 
2005-2012 
8.9 
Bulgaria 
2005-2012 
8.0 
Estonia 
2003-2012 
6.2 
Lithuania 
2004-2012 
5.0 
Latvia 
2001-2012 
4.9 
Romania 
2008-2012 
1.6 
Source: Data from country experts’ questionnaires, author’s review of Convergence Programmes of CEE 
countries. 
The sources for covering transition costs were also differently mixed. In general, there are 
three such sources: financing from taxes and other budgetary revenues (a burden for working 
generation), financing from savings in the existing PAYG system (a burden for the retired 
generation), and an increase of the general government debt (a burden for future generations). 
Lindeman et al (2001) underline that placing the entire burden of transition on any single 
sources is likely to be sub-optimal, as it would unevenly burden one of  generations. It is 
important to carefully consider the size and distribution of all benefits, costs and risks when 
deciding on the size and financing of the second pillar. As it can be seen from the Table 3, 
many countries in CEE region, decided on relatively smaller second pillars with smaller risks 
and smaller potential benefits. This applies mainly to countries that introduced their reforms 
later. The initial strategies for covering the transition costs differed between countries (Table 
1.2).  
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Table 1. 4 Initial plans for covering transition cost in 8 CEE countries 
Country Increase of government sector 
revenues (taxes, social security 
contributions) 
Savings in existing 
PAYG pillar 
Privatisation 
revenues 
Bulgaria x x  
Estonia x x  
Latvia x x  
Lithuania  x x 
Hungary  x  
Poland  x x 
Romania x x  
Slovakia x x  
Source: Authors’ compilation based on Pension Reform in Central and Eastern Europe (E. Fultz, ed., 2002), 
ILO 2002 and Convergence Programmes of CEE countries. 
Most of the countries of the CEE region assumed that the main source of financing the 
transitional deficit would be the rationalization of pension expenditures in existing PAYG 
public schemes, although the appropriate laws were not (in most cases) passed before the 
mandatory pension funds started (Fultz, 2012). 
Reformers planned, that  savings in the PAYG part of mandatory pension system would be 
achieved by introducing indexation of pension benefits closer to prices than wages, raising 
the retirement age, limiting early retirement and pension formula changes in the public 
scheme. Less generous indexation rules contributed to limiting public pension expenditure in 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary and Poland. However, most of the pension expenditure 
rationalization tools, even if implemented, were expected to reduce pension spending in 
medium and long term (Bielawska, 2014). 
In effect, the internal capacity of public pension systems to absorb the transition costs was 
reduced, what meant higher reliance on the general government subsidies.  
In order to assess the actual sources of financing the transition cost, we decomposed the 
transition cost of the contribution transfer to the mandatory funded component (as % of GDP) 
to three parts: 
 Financing from savings in the old-age expenditure measured as annual decline in old-
age pension expenditure, i.e. we assume that any reduction in expenditure on pensions 
finances transition (as planned in all of the analysed countries); 
 Financing from current taxes measured as decrease in the level of general government 
debt, i.e. we assume that in the case of decline of the government debt any additional 
transition cost was financed from current revenue; 
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 Financing from general government debt as the remaining (residual) part of the 
transition cost not covered by the first two items. 
Results of the decomposition show that the overall transition cost from the inception of the 
pension reform until 2011 in all of the CEE countries was financed to a large extent by the 
rise of the government debt. The debt financing was highest in Hungary (95% of all transition 
cost), Romania (84%) and Poland (74%) while the lowest in Lithuania (13% of transition 
cost) and Latvia (28% of transition cost). Contrary to the initial plans, financing from old-age 
savings did not contribute much to the financing of the transition cost. In Hungary there was 
no decline in pension expenditure. In Latvia the decline in pension expenditure financed more 
than half of the transition cost and in Lithuania it was around a quarter. In the remaining 
countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Poland, Romania) it was below 20 per cent of total transition 
cost. Current revenue financing significantly contributed to financing of the transition in 
Lithuania, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Estonia.  
Figure 1. 1 Share of old-age pension savings, taxes and debt in transition cost financing in the CEE 
countries from inception of the reform until 2011  
 
Source: Authors’ analysis. 
Furthermore, the need to finance transition from government debt in all of the CEE countries 
under consideration became visible especially in the Great Recession time.  Debt financing 
replaced other means in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia, while it remained 
the main source of financing of pension reform in Hungary, Poland and Romania.  
Decomposition of the sources of financing the transition cost clearly indicates that the crisis 
led to the abrupt shift towards debt financing. This combined with the overall decline in 
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public finance situation led to the retreat or suspension of pension reform efforts in the CEE 
countries.  
Figure 1. 1. Annual decomposition of financing transition costs in the CEE countries 
  
  
  
  
Source: Authors’ analysis. 
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Chapter 2: Analysis of the functioning of funded parts of the pension 
system in selected CEE countries in the context of the implemented changes 
Dariusz Stańko 
In this chapter we investigate the changes in the functioning of funded pillars in selected CEE 
countries. Next, we analyse the question to what extent the performance of pension funds was 
not satisfactory and could induce the retrenchment of pension funds.  
2.1. Development of funded pillars in selected CEE countries 
Table 2.1 presents the summary of the development of funded schemes in the eight countries. 
The most important developments during the decade of implementation included a 
consolidation of the market in some of the countries (Hungary, Poland, and Estonia) and the 
establishment of new investment portfolios in others.  
The consolidation process can be associated with high entry and compliance costs which put 
a pressure on pension managing companies with smaller number of clients to either sell their 
business or to merge with the other market players being in the same situation. The new 
investment portfolios that appeared in the pension markets of the CEE related to so-called 
multifunds, i.e. the life cycle portfolios that were developed to better suit the risk profile of 
pension fund members. 
The number of participants increased in all countries, due to mandatory coverage of new 
entrants as well as voluntary switching
3. By the end of 2012, mandatory pension funds’ assets 
exceeded 5% of GDP in Bulgaria and Estonia, while in Poland where the system was 
introduced relatively early and the size of contribution was substantial, assets reached almost 
17% of GDP. In Hungary and Latvia the size of pension funds was smaller, due to a reversal 
of the funded part in Hungary and the temporary suspension of pension contributions in 
Latvia.  
  
                                                 
3
 With exception of Hungary, the table presents status quo after the reversal of the funded part. 
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Table 2. 1 General information on mandatory funded scheme development in 8 CEE countries 
Country Year of 
implemen
tation 
Number of managing 
companies [number of 
portfolios managed] 
Number of participants 
(million) 
Contribution 
rate  
(% of wage) 
end of 2012 
Assets  
(% GDP) 
end of 2012 
initially end of 
2012 
initially end of 
2012 
Bulgaria 
(universal 
funds) 
2002* 8 (2004) 9 1.61  
(Dec 2003) 
3.24 5% 6.55% 
Estonia 07.2002 15 6 [23] 
(2014) 
0.21 0.63  
(Jul 2012) 
4%+2% (extra by 
employee) 
8% (Jan 2011) 
Hungary 01.1998 38 10 [30]** 1.34 0.07 10% 0.73% 
Latvia 01.2003**
* 
5 [10] 8 [26] 0.30 1.20 2%**** 0.68% 
Lithuania 06.2004 10 [26] 9 [30] 0.44 1.05 (Oct 
2013) 
1.5%# 4.24% 
Poland 04.1999## 21 14### 7.0 
(12.1999) 
15.94 2.3%#### 16.89% 
Romania 05.2008 14 9+ 3.82 5.77 3.5%++ n/a 
Slovakia 01.2005+
++ 
6 [18] 6 [18] n/a n/a 9% n/a 
* universal funds, mandatory for most of workers; occupational funds for workers in hazardous conditions were 
created in 2000; ** in 2014 the number of companies dropped to 7, *** assets were managed by the state 
treasury until 1 January 2003 and invested in state securities and bank deposits (Kritzer, 2001-2002), **** 4% 
in 2014 to increase by 1% to 6% by 2016; # 2.0+1+1% in 2014 to increase 3.5+2+5% from 2020 (Šarūnas, 
2012, p. 3); ## medium-aged cohorts could decide on whether to join the system until end-1999; ### 13 funds in 
2014; #### since April 2014 membership in open pension funds (OFEs) is voluntary and contribution will 
amount 2.92%; + eight companies in 2014; ++ contribution in 2014 was 4.5%; +++ persons under 52 could 
decide to join the system until June 2006 (Milev and Nenovsky, 2012, p.76). 
Sources: Bulgaria (http://www.fsc.bg/Statistics-en-216; Milev and Nenovsky, 2012, p. 74; Federacion 
International de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (2012, p. 154), Estonia 
(https://www.fi.ee/index.php?id=1787; Volskis, 2012, pp. 10, 13), Hungary (Kritzer, 2001-2002; 
https://felugyelet.mnb.hu/data/cms2102295/timeseries_pensionfunds_Q3_2013.xls; Goldenbook 2012, 
https://felugyelet.mnb.hu/en/left_menu/pszafen_publication/golden_books.html; IFS GDP data; 
http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/fileview2.aspx?IDFile=cc87a230-9eaf-4386-9f94-c2f80b0a9dd3), Latvia (Jērāne, 
2012; http://www.manapensija.lv/en/2nd-pension-pillar; OECD statistics), Lithuania (Volskis, 2012, pp. 15, 17; 
Šarūnas, 2012, p. 3); Poland (Polish Financial Supervisory Authority 2008, p. 10; www.knf.gov.pl); Romania 
(http://www.apapr.ro/statistics.html; http://www.aon.com/attachments/human-capital-consulting/Global%2520-
Retirement%2520Update--January%25202014.pdf); Slovakia (Milev and Nenovsky, 2012, p. 76; National Bank 
of Slovakia). 
2.2. Brief description of asset allocation policy 
With regard to investment policy, most of pension funds in analysed countries followed a 
very conservative approach (Table 2.2). Until 2005 the percentage of public and private 
bonds in their portfolios was substantial ranging from 45-50% (Estonia in 2001 and Slovakia 
in 2001-2003) to 60-75% in other countries. Even in recent years (2012-2013) funds in 
Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Slovakia allocated more than half of their assets in bonds 
with Estonia and Latvia having smaller fraction of money (20 and 33%, respectively) 
invested in this asset class.  
Bond holdings were dominated by public Treasury bonds. One of possible explanations for 
that lies in the fact that corporate debt markets are dominated by bank-based lending and yet 
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need to develop in the region. Another factor can relate to the high state indebtedness which 
kept yields on public debt securities attractively high. In Bulgaria, the ratio of public 
securities in the total bond allocation was initially high (85%) with some decrease to 60-55% 
in 2005-2008 and increase to 60-70% afterword. Estonian holdings consisted of 50-60% at 
the beginning, whereas Latvia kept during 2011-2013 even more Treasury papers – 
increasing from 60 to 70% of all bond positions. The extreme case was represented by 
Hungary, Poland and Romania where their initial investments in bonds were basically the 
securities issued by the state – in Hungary its ratio was 90% whereas in Poland it kept around 
95% until 2011 and dropped to some 80% in 2012-2013. The Romanian bond holdings 
constituted of 90% in Treasury papers. Slovak funds initially invested 70-80% of its bond 
portfolio in Treasuries with a drop to 40-50% in 2006-2007 and increase to 60-50% in recent 
years
4
. Overall, the public debt was a main part of the investment portfolios in all CEE 
countries with the exception of Estonia.  
Other very safe asset class, cash and deposits, were all the time substantial in Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia – even the recent holdings are still well above 15%. Poland, 
Hungary and Romania represent the other group where cash and deposits are kept mainly for 
liquidity purposes and do not exceed 10% of the total portfolio. 
  
                                                 
4
 Source: OECD Global Pension Statistics data. 
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Table 2. 2. Asset allocation in shares, bonds and cash and deposits as a percentage of total investment 
portfolio 
 
Source: Excerpt from the OECD Global Pensions Statistics. 
When analysing the aggressiveness of investment proxied by exposure to stock, the most 
conspicuous country was Poland that kept it at around 30% all the time, with a temporal 
decrease resulted as an aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008. Pension funds in other 
countries followed much more conservative policy. 
2.3. Riskiness of portfolios 
This section analyses some risk measures relating to investment results discussed so far. 
Table 2.3 presents volatility of returns. Column SD(%) shows the volatility of monthly 
nominal returns measured over the whole calculation period, next two columns - the length of 
the calculation period (i.e. from the moment system was initiated until end of 2012), next two 
columns – the monthly standard deviation (monthly SD) and annualised standard deviation 
(annual.SD). The last column presents the coefficient of variation, which is a crude proxy of 
the “efficiency” of yearly nominal rates of return5 compared to annualised volatility. The 
lower the value of this coefficient was, the better was the trade-off between the risk taken and 
the return obtained. 
                                                 
5
 Arithmetic average rates of return. 
Shares (% of total portfolio)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Bulgaria 2.8 2.9 6.4 15.8 21.5 10.4 11.3 14.8 11.7 11.0 12.8
Estonia 17.7 11.4 33.5 35.1 16.9 14.8 9.7 5.5 3.8 3.8 3.6 5.2 6.1
Latvia 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.5
Hungary 9.1 9.0 7.9 7.8 9.4 14.0 12.2 10.8 9.2 6.5 4.7 3.7
Poland 28.4 27.7 31.9 33.2 31.8 34.0 34.6 21.5 30.2 36.3 30.7 34.8 41.4
Romania 14.0
Slovakia 0.9 1.1 10.7 6.3 8.6 8.9 2.7 0.2 1.4 1.2 0.2 1.1
Bonds issued by private and public sector (% of total portfolio)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Bulgaria 74.0 74.8 70.3 51.9 45.6 54.8 45.2 44.1 51.8 57.6 54.1
Estonia 46.6 60.1 55.9 52.5 45.7 41.1 26.1 27.6 34.1 17.8 26.0 25.6 21.3
Latvia 35.0 24.1 27.8 29.1 33.6
Hungary 73.1 73.6 75.5 75.5 69.7 66.8 62.0 56.8 54.5 62.5 64.9 65.7
Poland 68.0 67.8 62.4 59.9 63.1 62.1 61.0 74.9 66.5 59.4 62.4 55.8 51.7
Romania 78.4
Slovakia 48.1 51.4 53.5 11.2 44.3 49.0 66.3 68.4 68.4 67.9 68.5 66.3
Cash and deposits (% of total portfolio)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Bulgaria 19.9 19.9 19.2 24.3 17.5 23.9 28.3 24.3 23.0 19.4 19.1
Estonia 32.7 14.9 8.2 4.4 6.0 6.0 12.7 14.1 15.3 9.4 16.4 16.4 17.4
Latvia 35.0 31.8 22.2 15.0 16.5
Hungary 4.4 1.6 1.4 1.4 2.5 1.2 3.0 2.5 1.6 4.1 3.9 4.6
Poland 3.5 4.2 4.8 5.8 4.1 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.3 3.5 5.7 8.3 6.0
Romania 7.2
Slovakia 28.7 34.4 31.4 81.9 43.1 34.1 24.4 29.2 26.5 28.1 22.7 20.5
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Due to different investment horizons, diverged investment regulations and resulting actual 
asset allocation policies in each jurisdiction, it is quite difficult to compare directly the 
volatilities across the countries. However a few observations can be made. First, as it might 
have been expected, the volatility corresponds to the type of fund and its asset allocation and 
increases in line with exposure to more risky assets (mainly shares). The only exception here 
is Slovakia where conservative funds exhibited much higher volatility (6.3% in total) than the 
aggressive or balanced portfolios. The second observation is that the volatility of returns in 
Poland that followed more aggressive investment policy is much lower (2.33% in total and 
0.18% as monthly) compared to the other countries. Finally, the most efficient risk-return 
trade-off could be observed in low-risk funds in Latvia, Lithuania (coefficients of variation 
being lower than 0.07) and in relatively aggressive funds of Poland (0.07) and Romania 
(0.04). The least effective in terms of risk efficiency were aggressive funds in Hungary (1.3) 
and quite surprisingly, conservative funds in Slovakia (1.58). 
Table 2. 3. Volatility of nominal returns 
  SD(%) no. of 
years 
months monthly. 
SD  
annual SD coefficient 
of variation 
Bulgaria all funds 2.66% 9.33 112 0.25% 0.87% 0.24 
Estonia all funds 1.96% 10.50 126 0.17% 0.60% 0.14 
conservative 0.83% 3.00 36 0.14% 0.48% 0.16 
balanced 1.48% 3.00 36 0.25% 0.85% 0.26 
progressive 2.26% 3.00 36 0.38% 1.30% 0.26 
aggressive 2.90% 3.00 36 0.48% 1.67% 0.24 
Latvia conservative 0.44% 10.00 120 0.04% 0.14% 0.03 
balanced 0.72% 10.00 120 0.07% 0.23% 0.06 
active 1.24% 10.00 120 0.11% 0.39% 0.10 
Lithuania conservative 0.69% 9.38 112.5 0.06% 0.22% 0.07 
stable 1.28% 9.38 112.5 0.12% 0.42% 0.10 
balanced 2.40% 9.38 112.5 0.23% 0.78% 0.16 
aggressive 4.52% 9.38 112.5 0.43% 1.48% 0.21 
Hungary* classic 4.92% 7.25 87 n/a 1.83% 0.18 
conservative 5.22% 15 180 n/a 1.35% 0.21 
balanced 12.79% 15 180 n/a 3.30% 0.57 
growth 20.64% 15 180 n/a 5.33% 1.30 
Poland all funds 2.33% 13.33 160 0.18% 0.64% 0.07 
Romania all funds 0.93% 4.5 54 0.13% 0.44% 0.04 
Slovakia aggressive 3.02% 7.75 93 0.31% 1.09% 0.42 
balanced 3.04% 7.75 93 0.32% 1.09% 0.67 
conservative 6.30% 7.75 93 0.65% 2.26% 1.58 
index 1.58% 0.75 9 0.53% 1.82% 0.37 
Note: Volatility of monthly nominal rates of return, market-weighted, for the whole calculation period until the 
end of 2012. * In case of Hungary annual returns were used. 
Source: Author’s analysis based on country sources. 
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2.4. Rates of returns 
As it has been discussed already (c.f. Table 1.5 in Chapter 1) the contribution rates in many 
countries have been suspended, or temporarily or permanently lowered. One of the 
hypotheses explaining the reasons for the reduction of the role of funded pillars in the CEE 
region is the pension funds’ unsatisfactory performance. Bad performance of pension funds, 
alongside with the high costs, was an argument often raised in public discussions in the CEE 
countries by politicians and some experts. To verify this statement about unsatisfactory 
performance, we analysed rates of return for the funded pillars in the eight countries from the 
moment of their introduction until the end of 2012. 
We used unit values to compute market-weighted average rates of return
6
, which in our 
opinion describe the effectiveness of investment for an average pension saver reasonably 
well
7
. Where life-cycle investment portfolios (so-called multi-funds) were offered, separate 
market indexes were created to account for the particular type of investment policy followed
8
. 
This refers to the Baltic States, Hungary and Slovakia. Although their investment limits vary, 
in most cases conservative funds practically have no exposure to equities and balanced funds 
are quite cautious in the Baltic region. 
Investment rates of return are calculated on the basis of investment units, which means that 
the returns account for management fees but do not take into consideration any fees paid on 
incoming contributions (upfront fee) or out-going payments (exit fees), the discussion of fees 
being outside of the scope of this article
9
. Nevertheless, the results can be seen as an 
appropriate proxy of private managing companies’ efficiency with investment money. 
2.4.1. Performance in nominal terms 
Negative nominal returns (Tables 2.4 and 2.5) were practically absent until the outbreak of 
the financial crisis in 2008 when pension funds incurred serious losses: Lithuanian aggressive 
                                                 
6
 The unit values for individual funds were retrieved from various websites or obtained directly from 
supervisory authorities. Further analysis used basic macroeconomic data describing inflation rates (CPI from 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics). 
7
 Market-share weighted return is representative of all savers that allocate their pension savings in line with the 
structure of the market. The only exclusion is Hungary where it was impossible to retrieve the earlier data on 
market shares – as a result, industry returns to 2004 (inclusive) are calculated as arithmetic averages, and from 
2005 on as market share-weighted averages.  
8
 This exercise was more difficult in the case of Lithuania where pension fund managers are allowed to offer as 
many portfolios as they wish and their investment policy is not constrained by investment limits. This creates 
problems for comparison for members (Castañeda and Rudolph, 2011, p. 7) and with proper investment style 
classification. We appreciate the kind help of Mr Audrius Šilgalis who provided us with classification 
information. 
9
 The latest update on the fee levels and their impact on pension savings can be found in: Ionescu and Robles 
(2014). 
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funds lost almost 54%, Estonian progressive and Hungarian aggressive funds suffered almost 
28% reductions. Funds in Latvia and Lithuania remained unaffected as they followed a 
conservative policy and Romanian pension funds that at that time were just entering the 
financial market had not invested substantially in equities. 
The Hungarian case is particularly interesting as 2008 was the first year when life cycle funds 
became mandatory in the country. At the outset of the life-cycle system most of savers, 
relatively young and not taking fund-choice decisions, were automatically allocated to default 
portfolios. However, it turned out to be the worst time to enter them because default funds 
represented the most aggressive portfolios. Feher and Holzer (2012) estimate that this 
resulted in average 1% decrease in returns per annum for the whole of the approximately 13-
years period the system was active (1998-2010). 
2.4.2. Performance in real terms 
Tables 2.6-2.7 present real returns in the analysed countries. The real effects of 2008 crisis 
were more profound. Excluding Romania (with positive 3%), all other countries suffered 
significant losses, irrespective of applied investment policy
10
. The level of accounted losses 
also depended on the type of investment strategy. 
The data show that even the pre-crisis performance in real terms was not satisfactory in 
Latvia, and in the case of selected portfolio types in Estonia, Lithuania and Slovakia. The 
reasons for this are outside the scope of this paper; however one might attribute them to 
overly conservative investment policies resulting from imposed investment guarantees (for 
the case of Slovakia, see Kawiński et al., 2010, p. 593) or geographical investment limits that 
retain a majority of funded pension assets in the country (the case of Latvia, where short-term 
financial instruments were offering a low interest rate, see Volskis, 2012, p. 9). 
  
                                                 
10
 An extended discussion about the effects of the financial crisis on the CEE pension markets can be found in 
Stańko (2009, pp. 25-43). 
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Table 2. 4. Nominal rates of return (%) in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; market-share weighted averages 
 
 
Bulgaria Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Type of funds mandatory all conservative balanced progressive aggressive conservative balanced aggressive conservative stable balanced aggressive 
Starting date of 
calculations 
1.07.2004 2.07.2002 2.07.2002 2.07.2002 2.07.2002 1.01.2010 7.01.2003 7.01.2003 7.01.2003 15.06.2004 15.06.2004 15.06.2004 15.06.2004 
2002  1.31  2.77  1.24  0.41  -       - 
2003  7.59  2.81  6.33  9.26  - 4.21  1.99  5.02     - 
2004 7.02  9.95  5.48  8.02  11.63  - 4.12  5.08  6.08  2.23  4.74  6.13  34.27  
2005 6.83  13.11  2.67  9.32  16.18  - 3.68  5.07  9.56  2.02  7.60  15.16  21.83  
2006 3.93  7.24  -0.48  4.31  9.11  - 0.45  -0.35  4.08  1.07  4.23  6.49  18.26  
2007 16.10  6.16  1.80  4.48  7.06  - 2.90  3.49  3.00  0.72  2.55  4.21  0.08  
2008 -21.19  -24.28  -2.03  -19.15  -27.36  - 1.94  -4.60  -13.52  2.12  -11.68  -28.13  -53.73  
2009 8.56  12.67  7.96  7.94  14.18  - 9.48  11.03  12.34  8.89  13.57  21.04  23.13  
2010 3.14  9.74  4.26  6.38  10.61  17.99  6.55  7.06  8.08  3.29  6.68  10.32  19.21  
2011 -0.57  -4.55  1.29  -1.74  -5.61  -9.78  1.79  -1.25  -3.60  0.25  -0.40  -4.18  -11.10  
2012 8.72  9.51  7.06  9.12  9.74  12.42  8.52  8.41  9.22  7.95  11.25  12.21  12.71  
Italics represent the results for periods shorter than 12 months. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 2. 5. Nominal rates of return (%) in Hungary*, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, market-share weighted averages 
 Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia 
Type of funds classic conservative balanced growth mandatory mandatory conservative balanced aggressive indexed 
Starting date of 
calculations 
1.01.1998 22.03.2005 22.03.2005 22.03.2005 1.09.1999 21.05.2008 22.03.2005 22.03.2005 22.03.2005 2.04.2012 
1998 15.69  - - - - - - - - - 
1999 17.11  - - - 15.05  - - - - - 
2000 7.87  - - - 12.99  - - - - - 
2001 7.98  - - - 7.31  - - - - - 
2002 7.62  - - - 13.62  - - - - - 
2003 2.77  - - - 10.92  - - - - - 
2004 16.44  - - - 14.19  - - - - - 
2005 12.49  - - - 15.04  - 2.84  3.22  3.44  - 
2006 8.20  - - - 16.38  - 3.49  4.38  4.69  - 
2007 5.82  - - - 6.24  - 4.11  3.71  3.63  - 
2008 - -0.64  -13.20  -27.66  -14.16  6.96  2.84  -5.38  -7.63  - 
2009 - 11.44  17.48  25.66  13.75  17.70  1.79  1.07  1.07  - 
2010 - 5.41  8.57  10.97  11.21  15.10  1.23  1.29  1.31  - 
2011 - 4.13  -0.13  -3.70  -4.66  3.10  1.50  1.50  1.52  - 
2012 - 11.67  16.47  15.16  16.35  10.50  2.78  3.28  3.39  4.97  
* Hungary – until 2004 (inclusive) arithmetic rates of returns. Italics represent the results for periods shorter than 12 months. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 2. 6. Real rates of return (%) in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; market-share weighted averages 
 
 
Bulgaria Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Type of funds mandatory all conservative balanced progressive aggressive conservative balanced aggressive conservative stable balanced aggressive 
Starting date of 
calculations 
1.07.2004 2.07.2002 2.07.2002 2.07.2002 2.07.2002 1.01.2010 7.01.2003 7.01.2003 7.01.2003 15.06.2004 15.06.2004 15.06.2004 15.06.2004 
2002 - -0.45  0.98  -0.52  -1.33  - - - - - - - - 
2003 - 6.17  1.45  4.93  7.82  - 1.22  1.13  2.01  - - - - 
2004 3.78  6.69  2.36  4.83  8.33  - -1.95  -1.64  -0.10  1.58  4.07  5.46  33.42  
2005 1.70  8.67  -1.37  5.03  11.61  - -2.87  -0.80  2.64  -0.60  4.83  12.19  18.69  
2006 -3.11  2.69  -4.70  -0.12  4.48  - -5.71  -4.53  -2.31  -2.58  0.46  2.64  14.00  
2007 7.10  -0.42  -4.50  -1.99  0.43  - -6.54  -6.31  -6.45  -4.73  -3.00  -1.43  -5.35  
2008 -29.85  -31.39  -11.23  -26.75  -34.19  - -11.67  -18.01  -25.06  -7.94  -20.38  -35.21  -58.29  
2009 5.65  12.77  8.06  8.03  14.28  - 5.75  5.89  8.51  4.26  8.75  15.90  17.90  
2010 0.68  6.57  1.25  3.31  7.41  14.58  7.73  8.96  9.26  1.93  5.27  8.87  17.64  
2011 -4.60  -9.07  -3.51  -6.40  -10.09  -14.06  -2.49  -5.19  -7.65  -3.73  -4.35  -7.98  -14.63  
2012 5.60  5.37  3.00  4.99  5.59  8.16  6.13  7.01  6.81  4.72  7.92  8.86  9.34  
Italics represent the results for periods shorter than 12 months. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 2. 7. Real rates of return (%) in Hungary*, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, market-share weighted averages 
 Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia 
Type of funds classic conservative balanced growth mandatory mandatory conservative balanced aggressive indexed 
Starting date of 
calculations 
1.01.1998 22.03.2005 22.03.2005 22.03.2005 1.09.1999 21.05.2008 22.03.2005 22.03.2005 22.03.2005 2.04.2012 
1998 1.33  - - - - - - - - - 
1999 6.43  - - - 10.44  - - - - - 
2000 -1.74  - - - 2.66  - - - - - 
2001 -1.08  - - - 1.73  - - - - - 
2002 2.24  - - - 11.51  - - - - - 
2003 -1.80  - - - 10.05  - - - - - 
2004 9.05  - - - 10.24  - - - - - 
2005 8.63  - - - 12.66  - 0.80  1.17  1.39  - 
2006 4.16  - - - 15.10  - -0.95  -0.10  0.20  - 
2007 -1.96  - - - 3.76  - 1.32  0.93  0.85  - 
2008 - -6.32  -18.16  -31.80  -17.73  3.00  -1.68  -9.54  -11.69  - 
2009 - 6.94  12.74  20.58  9.55  11.47  0.17  -0.53  -0.54  - 
2010 - 0.51  3.52  5.81  8.28  8.49  0.27  0.33  0.35  - 
2011 - 0.17  -3.93  -7.36  -8.56  -2.54  -2.33  -2.33  -2.31  - 
2012 - 5.64  10.19  8.94  12.35  6.93  -0.80  -0.31  -0.21  1.31  
* Hungary – until 2004 (inclusive) arithmetic rates of returns. Italics represent the results for periods shorter than 12 months. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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2.4.3. Accumulated performance 
Losses that occurred during the financial crisis might have spurred politicians to consider 
changes to the funded pension systems. Tables 2.8-2.9 provide information about the longer-
term performance of pension markets (the accumulated real rate of return from the inception 
of a particular funded pillar until the end of the consecutive year). 
As of the end of 2012 the funded pension systems in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Slovakia were losing invested contributions in real terms. It seems that due to various factors 
(related to investment policy, benchmarking, guarantees and local market capacity), pension 
funds in these countries were either unable to produce above-inflation results in the analysed 
longer-term or to recover from the losses incurred during the financial crisis. The 
accumulated real returns were positive in Romania, Hungary and Poland (Table 2.9). 
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Table 2. 8. Accumulated real rates of return (%) in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; market-share weighted averages 
 Bulgaria Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Type of funds mandatory all conservative balanced progressive aggressive conservative balanced aggressive conservative stable balanced aggressive 
Starting date of 
calculations 
1.07.2004 2.07.2002 2.07.2002 2.07.2002 2.07.2002 1.01.2010 7.01.2003 7.01.2003 7.01.2003 15.06.2004 15.06.2004 15.06.2004 15.06.2004 
2002 - -0.45  0.98  -0.52  -1.33  - - - -  -   -   -  - 
2003 - 5.69  2.45  4.38  6.38  - 1.22  1.13  2.01   -   -   -  - 
2004 3.78  12.76  4.87  9.42  15.24  - -0.75  -0.53  1.90  1.58  4.07  5.46  33.42  
2005 5.55  22.54  3.43  14.92  28.63  - -3.60  -1.33  4.59  0.97  9.10  18.31  58.36  
2006 2.27  25.84  -1.43  14.79  34.39  - -9.10  -5.80  2.18  -1.63  9.60  21.44  80.53  
2007 9.53  25.32  -5.86  12.51  34.97  - -15.05  -11.75  -4.41  -6.29  6.31  19.70  70.87  
2008 -23.17  -14.03  -16.43  -17.59  -11.17  - -24.96  -27.64  -28.37  -13.73  -15.35  -22.45  -28.72  
2009 -18.83  -3.05  -9.70  -10.97  1.52  - -20.65  -23.38  -22.27  -10.05  -7.95  -10.12  -15.96  
2010 -18.27  3.32  -8.58  -8.03  9.04  12.87  -14.52  -16.51  -15.07  -8.31  -3.10  -2.15  -1.14  
2011 -22.03  -6.05  -11.79  -13.91  -1.96  -3.00  -16.65  -20.84  -21.57  -11.73  -7.32  -9.96  -15.60  
2012 -17.67  -1.01  -9.14  -9.62  3.52  4.92  -11.54  -15.29  -16.22  -7.56  0.03  -1.99  -7.72  
Italics represent the results for periods shorter than 12 months. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 2. 9. Accumulated real rates of return (%) in Hungary*, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, market-share weighted averages 
 Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia 
Type of funds classic conservative balanced growth mandatory mandatory conservative balanced aggressive indexed 
Starting date of 
calculations 
1.01.1998 22.03.2005 22.03.2005 22.03.2005 1.09.1999 21.05.2008 22.03.2005 22.03.2005 22.03.2005 2.04.2012 
1998 1.33  - - - - - - - - - 
1999 7.84  - - - 10.44  - - - - - 
2000 5.97  - - - 13.38  - - - - - 
2001 4.82  - - - 15.33  - - - - - 
2002 7.17  - - - 28.61  - - - - - 
2003 5.25  - - - 41.53  - - - - - 
2004 14.77  - - - 56.03  - - - - - 
2005 24.68  - - - 75.78  - 0.80  1.17  1.39  - 
2006 29.87  - - - 102.32  - -0.16  1.08  1.59  - 
2007 27.32  - - - 109.93  - 1.15  2.01  2.45  - 
2008 - 19.28  4.20  -13.17  72.70  3.00  -0.55  -7.72  -9.52  - 
2009 - 27.56  17.46  4.71  89.20  14.81  -0.38  -8.21  -10.00  - 
2010 - 28.20  21.60  10.79  104.86  24.55  -0.11  -7.91  -9.69  - 
2011 - 28.42  16.83  2.63  87.33  21.38  -2.43  -10.05  -11.77  - 
2012 - 35.66  28.73  11.81  110.48  29.80  -3.21  -10.33  -11.96  1.31  
* Hungary – until 2004 (inclusive) arithmetic rates of returns. Italics represent the results for periods shorter than 12 months. 
Source: Author’s calculations.  
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2.4.4. Average longer-term performance in real terms 
Table 2.10 shows average annual real returns in a longer perspective, i.e. as of end-2012 
since the inception of the system. The accumulated return of Hungarian pension funds, even 
though positive (12-38%) might not be satisfactory in this longer-term perspective as the 
average yearly premium over the inflation rate at the end of 2012 was merely 2 percentage 
points in the case of conservative funds, 1.7 pp for balanced funds) and only 0.75pp for 
growth funds)
11
. The highest returns are observed in Romania and Poland where the annual 
average real return was close to 6 pp.  
Table 2. 10. Average annual real rates of return since the inception of the system, end of 2012 
Country  Type of fund Starting date of 
calculations 
Average annual rate of 
return (%) 
Bulgaria mandatory 1.07.2004 -2.06 
Estonia all 2.07.2002 -0.10 
conservative -0.91 
balanced -0.96 
progressive  0.33 
aggressive 1.01.2010 1.61 
Latvia balanced 7.01.2003 -1.22 
aggressive -1.65 
conservative -1.75 
Lithuania conservative 15.06.2004 -0.84 
stable 0.00 
balanced -0.21 
aggressive -0.85 
Hungary classic 1.01.1998  
until end of 2007 
3.39 
conservative 22.03.2005 2.05 
balanced 1.70 
growth 0.75 
Poland mandatory 1.09.1999 5.74 
Romania mandatory 21.05.2008 5.97 
Slovakia conservative 22.03.2005 -0.42 
balanced -1.40 
aggressive -1.63 
indexed 2.04.2012 1.75 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
                                                 
11
 At the beginning of dismantling process in Hungary, i.e. as of the end of 2009, these results were, 
respectively, 2.05% (conservative), 1.35% (balanced), and 0.38% (aggressive), which definitely could not be 
seen as overly optimistic, especially bearing in mind that these do not account for upfront fees. 
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The above results show that even upon not the time horizon much shorter than accumulation 
phase of 30-40 years, Hungary and Poland did not have valid grounds for their decision to 
reverse or partially reverse their funded pension systems long-term investment results. Polish 
pension funds had the best real return performance, whereas the Hungarian system’s 
performance could potentially have been improved by legal changes. 
2.5. Investment performance vs economic performance 
An interesting measure of efficiency of individual pension funds as well as the rationality test 
of introduction funded pillars in the region is the comparison of investment performance of 
pension funds with the country’s economic development measured by its GDP. As majority 
of analysed CEE funded systems is of mandatory character, the comparison to GDP, 
therefore, to consumption can be somehow questioned. The obvious alternative benchmark 
would be the wage bill (fund) growth. However, due to difficulties with obtaining the data, 
this approach was not used. Moreover, bearing in mind that the countries in question could, 
instead of introducing the funded pillar, have changed their pay-as-you-go DB systems to the 
notional defined contribution (NDC) entirely this comparison still seems to be 
methodologically acceptable. 
In 2008, in the result of financial crisis and dramatic erosion of stock market prices pension 
funds in all research countries had much lower real return performance than the GDP (Tables 
2.11 and 2.12). This effect is linked to the lagged reaction of the GDP indicator – the first 
was the financial shock reflected in stock exchange prices which was later on channelled to 
the economy as a whole via labour and real markets. Similar effect was observed in 2011 – 
all countries in question revealed negative excess returns over GDP growth in real terms. 
However, what seems to be a subject of concern is the relative performance of funded pillars 
in other periods. Practically all countries but Poland (Table 2.11) recorded repeatedly lower 
real returns than the GDP in the pre-crisis period. Years 2009-2010 were in most of the 
countries a time of recovery; however in Slovakia all types of funds had almost 5% lower real 
performance than the GDP. 
The analysis of accumulated excess real returns over GDP real growth (Tables 2.13-2.14) 
shows quite clearly that in the longer-, but still not long-, run the funded pension pillars 
performed better only in Hungary, Poland and Romania (Table 2.14). In other countries, the 
negative gap between increase of GDP in real terms and corresponding increase of real assets 
ranged from 0.3-0.4pp in Slovakia to 29-35 pp in Lithuania, 39 in Bulgaria, 35-45 in Estonia 
and 42-45 in Latvia.  
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Table 2. 11. Excess real return over GDP growth (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) 
 Bulgaria Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
type mandatory 
pfs 
all funds conservative balanced progressive aggressive conservative balanced aggressive conservative stable balanced aggressive 
calculated since 1.07.2004 2.07.2002 2.07.2002 2.07.2002 2.07.2002 1.01.2010 7.01.2003 7.01.2003 7.01.2003 15.06.2004 15.06.2004 15.06.2004 15.06.2004 
2002 - -4.42  -2.99  -4.49  -5.30  - - - - - - - - 
2003 - -1.39  -6.11  -2.63  0.26  - -6.38  -6.47  -5.59  - - - - 
2004 0.41  -0.54  -4.87  -2.40  1.10  - -10.81  -10.50  -8.96  -2.41  0.08  1.47  29.43  
2005 -4.66  -0.76  -10.80  -4.40  2.18  - -12.99  -10.92  -7.48  -8.39  -2.96  4.40  10.90  
2006 -9.62  -7.40  -14.80  -10.21  -5.61  - -17.33  -16.15  -13.93  -9.98  -6.94  -4.76  6.59  
2007 0.65  -7.91  -11.99  -9.48  -7.06  - -16.34  -16.11  -16.24  -15.82  -14.09  -12.52  -16.43  
2008 -36.04  -27.72  -7.56  -23.08  -30.51  - -8.49  -14.84  -21.89  -10.57  -23.01  -37.84  -60.92  
2009 11.13  27.03  22.31  22.29  28.54  - 19.93  20.08  22.69  19.08  23.56  30.71  32.72  
2010 0.29  4.30  -1.02  1.04  5.15  12.32  10.60  11.84  12.14  0.31  3.65  7.25  16.03  
2011 -6.44  -18.61  -13.05  -15.93  -19.62  -23.59  -7.49  -10.18  -12.65  -9.84  -10.47  -14.10  -20.75  
2012 5.01  0.72  -1.65  0.34  0.94  3.51  1.29  2.18  1.98  0.88  4.09  5.02  5.50  
Italics represent the results for periods shorter than 12 months. In such case, the GDP real growth rates were adjusted to the period's length by scaling arithmetically. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 2. 12. Excess real return over GDP growth (Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia) 
 Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia 
type classic conservative balanced growth mandatory 
pfs 
mandatory 
pfs 
conservative balanced aggressive indexed 
calculated 
since 
1.01.1998 22.03.2005 22.03.2005 22.03.2005 1.09.1999 21.05.2008 22.03.2005 22.03.2005 22.03.2005 2.04.2012 
1998 -2.75  - - - - - - - - - 
1999 3.24  - - - 8.93  - - - - - 
2000 -5.97  - - - -1.60  - - - - - 
2001 -4.79  - - - 0.52  - - - - - 
2002 -2.26  - - - 10.06  - - - - - 
2003 -5.65  - - - 6.18  - - - - - 
2004 4.25  - - - 4.90  - - - - - 
2005 4.67  - - - 9.05  - -4.20  -3.82  -3.61  - 
2006 0.20  - - - 8.87  - -9.46  -8.60  -8.31  - 
2007 -2.47  - - - -3.02  - -9.26  -9.65  -9.73  - 
2008 - -6.98  -18.82  -32.46  -22.86  -0.68  -7.85  -15.71  -17.86  - 
2009 - 13.49  19.29  27.13  7.93  18.04  5.22  4.52  4.52  - 
2010 - -0.28  2.73  5.02  4.40  9.63  -4.55  -4.50  -4.47  - 
2011 - -1.64  -5.73  -9.17  -12.88  -4.87  -5.03  -5.03  -5.01  - 
2012 - 7.12  11.66  10.42  10.22  6.38  -2.40  -1.92  -1.82  0.11  
Italics represent the results for periods shorter than 12 months. In such case, the GDP real growth rates were adjusted to the period's length by scaling arithmetically. 
Source: Author’s calculations.  
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Table 2. 13. Accumulated excess real return over GDP growth (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania) 
 Bulgaria Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
type mandatory pfs all funds conservative balanced progressive aggressive conservative balanced aggressive conservative stable balanced aggressive 
calculat
ed since 
1.07.2004 2.07.20
02 
2.07.2002 2.07.20
02 
2.07.200
2 
1.01.20
10 
7.01.2003 7.01.20
03 
7.01.20
03 
15.06.200
4 
15.06.20
04 
15.06.20
04 
15.06.20
04 
2002 - -4.42  -2.99  -4.49  -5.30  - - - - - - - - 
2003 - -5.75  -8.92  -7.00  -5.06  - -6.38  -6.47  -5.59  - - - - 
2004 0.41  -6.26  -13.35  -9.24  -4.01  - -16.50  -16.29  -14.05  -2.41  0.08  1.47  29.43  
2005 -4.27  -6.97  -22.70  -13.23  -1.92  - -27.35  -25.43  -20.48  -10.60  -2.89  5.93  43.54  
2006 -13.48  -13.86  -34.14  -22.10  -7.42  - -39.94  -37.48  -31.56  -19.52  -9.63  0.89  53.00  
2007 -12.91  -20.67  -42.04  -29.48  -13.96  - -49.75  -47.55  -42.68  -32.26  -22.36  -11.75  27.86  
2008 -44.30  -42.66  -46.42  -45.75  -40.21  - -54.02  -55.33  -55.22  -39.42  -40.22  -45.14  -50.03  
2009 -38.10  -27.16  -34.46  -33.66  -23.15  - -44.85  -46.36  -45.06  -27.86  -26.14  -28.29  -33.68  
2010 -37.93  -24.03  -35.13  -32.97  -19.19  12.32  -39.01  -40.01  -38.39  -27.63  -23.44  -23.09  -23.05  
2011 -41.92  -38.17  -43.59  -43.65  -35.05  -14.18  -43.57  -46.12  -46.18  -34.76  -31.46  -33.94  -39.02  
2012 -39.01  -37.72  -44.52  -43.46  -34.44  -11.17  -42.84  -44.95  -45.12  -34.18  -28.65  -30.62  -35.66  
Italics represent the results for periods shorter than 12 months. In such case, the GDP real growth rates were adjusted to the period's length by scaling arithmetically. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 2. 14. Accumulated excess real return over GDP growth (Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia) 
 Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia 
type classic conservative balanced growth mandatory 
pfs 
mandatory 
pfs 
conservative balanced aggressive indexed 
calculated 
since 
1.01.1998 22.03.2005 22.03.2005 22.03.2005 1.09.1999 21.05.2008 22.03.2005 22.03.2005 22.03.2005 2.04.2012 
1998 -2.75  - - - - - - - - - 
1999 0.40  - - - 0.09  - - - - - 
2000 -5.59  - - - 0.07  - - - - - 
2001 -10.12  - - - 0.08  - - - - - 
2002 -12.15  - - - 0.19  - - - - - 
2003 -17.11  - - - 0.26  - - - - - 
2004 -13.59  - - - 0.32  - - - - - 
2005 -9.55  - - - 0.44  - -0.04  -0.04  -0.04  - 
2006 -9.37  - - - 0.57  - -0.13  -0.12  -0.12  - 
2007 -11.61  - - - 0.52  - -0.21  -0.21  -0.20  - 
2008   0.82  0.72  0.60  0.17  -0.01  -0.27  -0.33  -0.34  - 
2009   0.93  0.86  0.76  0.27  0.17  -0.24  -0.30  -0.32  - 
2010   0.93  0.88  0.80  0.32  0.29  -0.27  -0.33  -0.35  - 
2011   0.92  0.83  0.72  0.15  0.22  -0.31  -0.37  -0.38  - 
2012   0.98  0.93  0.80  0.27  0.30  -0.32  -0.38  -0.39  0.00  
Italics represent the results for periods shorter than 12 months. In such case, the GDP real growth rates were adjusted to the period's length by scaling arithmetically. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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This result suggest that from the purely economic point of view, from the perspective of the 
individual pension fund member the existence of funded pillars in those countries in the 
current design and for this, yet still relatively short time horizon, is questionable – for the 
time being, much better “job” could have been done via organising the pension system as a 
purely PAYG one with the GDP-linked rate of return
12
. Or, alternatively, it could have been 
more efficient, if the design of the particular pension system in question followed the ones 
applied in Poland, Hungary or Romania. Nevertheless, the fully-fledged comparison of 
competing pension models that would have required much longer perspective such as the 
length of accumulation period (30-40 years). 
Obviously, the discussion of what are the potential factors that contributed to this result so far 
is beyond the scope of the chapter. However it seems very likely that the most immediate 
‘culprits’ are: 
 investment limits – too conservative in most of the analysed countries, which 
prevented them from better use of equity premium (Table 2.15); 
 fee structure – in most of the countries fees are quite high, particularly the ones 
charged on assets under management (Table 2.16) which determine the long-term cost 
of saving for retirement; 
 timing – funded systems in Bulgaria, Baltic States, Romania and Slovak Republic 
were introduced much later than in Hungary and Poland. This might have resulted in 
some missed opportunities to gain on financial markets. Also, shorter history of 
systems does not yet allow for gaining full benefits from investment experience, 
decreasing costs due to increasing assets under management. 
  
                                                 
12
 Under the assumption that the wages are highly correlated with the GDP growth. 
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Table 2. 15. Investment limits in selected CEE funded systems in 2001, 2005 and 2012 
2001 Equity Real estate Bonds 
Retail investment 
funds 
Private investment 
funds 
Loans 
Bank 
deposits 
Hungary 50 0 50 (corporate)     0 no limit 
Poland 40* 0** no limit   not allowed as equity 20 
 
2005 Equity Real estate Bonds 
Retail investment 
funds 
Private investment 
funds 
Loans 
Bank 
deposits 
Bulgaria 10   
at least 50 (TB), 10 
(municipal), 20 (corporate), 
30 (mortgage) 
not allowed not allowed   25 
Latvia 
0 (conservative) up 
to 50 (most 
aggressive) 
not allowed       not allowed   
Lithuania 40 not allowed   20 not allowed     
Hungary 
non-listed 10 (both 
domestic and 
foreign) 
5% directly, 10% 
together with real 
estate investment 
funds 
no limit (TB), 10 (corporate 
and municipal), 25 
(mortgage) 
50 
5 (hedge funds, 
private equity funds) 
0 no limit 
Poland 40* 0** 
no limit (TB), 40 
(municipal, corporate), 40 
(mortgage, 15 if non-listed) 
15 (open-ended), 10 
(close-ended) 
not allowed as equity 20 
Romania               
Slovakia 
0 (conservative), 50 
(balanced) 80 
(aggressive) 
not allowed 
at least 100  (conservative), 
at least 50 (balanced), no 
limit (aggressive) 
50 not allowed not allowed no limit 
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2012 Equity Real estate Bonds 
Retail investment 
funds 
Private investment 
funds 
Loans 
Bank 
deposits 
Bulgaria     no limit         
Estonia 
0 (conservative), 25 
(balanced), 50 
(progressive), 75 
(aggressive) 
40 
no limit (listed), 10 
(unlisted) 
no limit no limit 10 no limit 
Latvia 
0 (conservative) up 
to 50 (most 
aggressive) 
            
Lithuania               
Hungary 
10 (conservative), 
10-40 (balanced), 
40 (growth) 
0 (conservative), 
10 (balanced), 20 
(growth) 
no limit (TB), 10 (corporate 
and municipal), 25 
(mortgage) 
50 
0 (conservative), 3 
(balanced), 5 
(growth), 5 
(derivatives, risk 
capital) 
0 no limit 
Poland 40* 0** 
no limit (TB), 40 
(municipal, corporate), 40 
(mortgage, 15 if non-listed) 
15 (open-ended), 10 
(close-ended) 
not allowed as equity 20 
Romania               
Slovakia 
0 (conservative 
compulsory created 
with guarantees), 
80 (equity without 
guarantees), other 
forms (any limit) 
  
0 (conservative compulsory 
created with guarantees), 80 
(equity without guarantees), 
other forms (any limit), 50 
(mortgage bonds) 
20 not allowed not allowed 
no limit (10 
for single 
bank) 
* on less liquid stock exchange market 10% (2001), 7.5% (2005 and 2012), * directly, possible indirect investment. 
Source: OECD, Annual survey of investment regulations, information from IOPS (www.iopsweb.org), Jeko and Nenovsky (2012) and author’s own elaboration based on 
personal contacts. 
 
  
Table 2. 16. Fees in the CEE funded second pillars (in %) – market weighted averages 
Country Date Average fee charged on  
contributions assets 
Bulgaria 2012 4.97 1.0 
Latvia 2012  2.0 
Lithuania* 2013 1.86 (max cap) 0.65 (max cap for conservative funds) 
0.99 (max cap for other type of funds) 
Poland 2011 3.5 0.46 
Romania 2012 2.5 0.6 
Slovakia* 2012 2.27 (max cap) 2.0 (max cap) 
* The values presented are not market-weighted averages but the legal maximum values that can be charged for 
a particular type of fee. 
Source: Excerpt from Ionescu and Robles (2014, pp. 9-10). 
2.6. Conclusions 
This chapter analysed the development of funded pension pillars in selected CEE with a focus 
on their performance. The markets saw an introduction of life cycle portfolios in Baltic 
States, Hungary and Slovakia and consolidation with decreasing number of pension fund 
operators in force. Most of the countries followed rather conservative investment policy 
which became only slightly and less restricted in recent years. The highest exposure to 
equities was observed in Poland. The riskiness of funds depended on the type of portfolio – 
its actual investment risk exposure. 
In general, the investment performance was not satisfactory, at least over the medium-term 
horizon of less than 15 years which suggests that a follow-up study in the future to re-
examine the performance of CEE funded systems would be worthwhile. Only funds in 
Poland, Romania and to some extent Hungary increased the value of paid in contributions in 
real terms. The same conclusion can be drawn when analysing accumulated excess real 
returns over the GDP growth. These results suggest that pension fund members in Bulgaria, 
Baltic States, and – to less extent - Slovak Republic could be better off with participating in 
the NDC-like unfunded pension system or in the funded pillars but with designs resembling 
more Poland, Romania or Hungary. The above conclusion comes with the caveat that the 
convincing conclusions with regard to whether funded pillars in CEE were better or worse 
than alternative systems (DB PAYG or NDC) would require much longer assessment 
horizon, at least comparable to the standard length of saving for retirement, that is 30-40 
years. 
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What is interesting in this aspect is the very probable conclusion that recent reversal in 
funded pillars which affected Hungary and Poland were not motivated by their poor 
investment performance. 
The sample data is not long enough to arrive in decisive conclusions with regard to the long-
term performance of analysed CEE funded pension systems. The history of long-term 
investment in various countries (with a famous US example used by Siegel, 2008) suggests 
that in the long-run the probability of achieving negative accumulated rates of returns from 
investment is getting extremely small. At the same time, the probability of occurring negative 
interim returns increases over the time horizon (Trainor, 2005, p. 332). 
In the long run, the funded pillar is better for future pensioners than the PAYG system when 
the real rate of return exceeds the growth of wage funds (the Aarons’ condition, Aaron, 
1996). According to D. Blake (2009, p. 4) this condition is met not only because pension 
funds can invest abroad in countries with higher economic growth rates. The condition is met 
also on the grounds of the so-called dynamic efficiency of economy. The dynamic efficiency 
(Abel et al., 1989) is present in the economy when at constant share of wages in the GDP the 
rate of return in investment in financial assets exceeds the rate of growth of wages, which – in 
the long – is the GDP growth rate (c.f. Blake, 2009, p. 4). To verify the above statement for 
the CEE pension systems much longer time horizon would have been required.  
  
48 
Chapter 3: Short-term effects of downsizing pension funds sector in 
selected CEE countries on their public finance situation, and the public 
pension system 
Kamila Bielawska, Agnieszka Chłoń-Domińczak 
In this chapter we analyse the data on public finance and transition cost in the CEE countries. 
We seek to identify factors essential to the development of mandatory funded pension 
schemes while maintaining fiscal sustainability. 
We use multivariate statistical analysis with variables related to the situation of public 
finance, pension system and macroeconomic situation. By applying this method, we seek to 
identify factors that are essential to the development prospects of mandatory funded pension 
schemes while maintaining fiscal sustainability. Then we use the regression model to identify 
which of the selected variables are statistically significant in explaining the level of general 
government deficit.  
 
3.1. Fiscal position of CEE countries after the crisis 
 
When the crisis hit economies of CEE countries, their fiscal position had worsen. Estonia was 
the only country not being subject to excessive deficit procedure (EDP) in years 2009-2010. 
But this fact did not stop the Estonian government to conduct fiscal consolidation, which 
resulted in a surplus or close to balance situation until the end of 2012. The same mechanism 
worked in Bulgaria, the second country (after Estonia) with very tight national fiscal rules, 
which pursue fiscal policy in line with budgetary medium-term objective. In other countries 
general government deficit exploded to 7-9% of GDP during 2009-2010. 
All countries of the CEE being member states of EU must conduct fiscal consolidation 
process in case of exceeding the reference value of general government deficit to GDP (3%). 
Gross general government debt should be kept below 60% GDP (fiscal rules in the EU are 
described in the details in the chapter 6). The scope of an minimum annual fiscal effort for a 
specified period is usually urged in the Council Recommendation. Requirements defined by 
the Council in terms to eliminate the EDP for the specified countries are shown in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3. 1. Decisions of Council on existing and abrogating excessive deficit procedure in 2009 – 2015 for 
CEE countries 
Country Date of the Decision 
on existing excessive 
deficit 
Minimum average annual 
fiscal effort required in 
structural terms 
Deadline for correction Abrogating 
of EDP  
Bulgaria 13 July 2010 1,25%  GDP 2011 22 June 2012 
Estonia Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Latvia 7 July 2009 2,25% GDP 2012 21 June 2013 
Lithuania 16 February 2010 2.25% GDP 2012 21 June 2013 
Hungary 5 July 2004 0.5% GDP for 2012 - 2013 Initial 2008, prolonged to 
2009 and further to 2011 
and 2012 
21 June 2013 
Poland 7 July 2009 1.25% GDP Initial 2012, prolonged 
by 2014 
12 May 2015 
Romania 7 July 2009 1.75% GDP Initial 2011 prolonged by 
2012 
21 June 2013 
Slovakia 2 December 2009 1.0% GDP 2013 17 June 2014 
Source: Council Decisions and Recommendation on existence and (where appropriate) the abrogation of 
excessive deficit procedure, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/corrective_arm/index_en.htm 
The strategies of fiscal consolidation were different as the sources of crises differed between 
countries. Table 3.2 shows the main instruments of fiscal consolidation outside the pension 
system on revenue and expenditure side of general government accounts. 
Table 3. 2. Instruments of fiscal consolidation outside the pension systems during 2009 – 2012 
Country Revenue side Expenditure side 
Increase of 
VAT rates 
(permanent 
or 
temporal) 
Increase 
of excise 
duty 
Increase 
of 
property 
tax 
Increase of 
dividends 
from state 
owned 
companies 
Reduction 
of public 
sector 
salaries 
Freeze 
of 
public 
sector 
salaries 
Rationalization 
of social 
benefits except 
pensions 
Bulgaria  x    x x 
Estonia    x   x 
Latvia x x x x  x x 
Lithuania      x x 
Hungary      x x 
Poland x x    x x 
Romania x    x  x 
Slovakia x x x   x  
Source: Authors’ resume on the base of Convergence or Stability Programmes of each country for years 2009 – 
2012. 
Fiscal consolidation with regards to revenue side comprised not only the increase (permanent 
or temporal) of tax rates, but also assumed widening the tax base and increase of efficiency of 
tax collection. The countries which used revenue side instruments of fiscal consolidation 
were Latvia, Poland, Slovakia and to some extent Bulgaria and Romania. More popular were 
expenditure side instruments, including overall non-interest public spending freeze or growth 
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limits (usually below the growth of potential GDP), especially the wage bill freeze or 
decrease (as in Romania) and social transfer reduction and rationalisation. 
Taking into account the instruments of fiscal consolidation connected with mandatory 
pension system, 7 out of the 8 analysed countries (with exception of Bulgaria), decided on 
temporal or partial reduction of contribution to funded pillar and/or partial or permanent 
reversal from prefunding of pension, as described earlier. Other instruments of fiscal 
consolidation within the pension systems were: freeze of pensions or reduction of pensions’ 
indexation (except Estonia and Poland), increase in retirement age or acceleration of increase 
in retirement age and other parametric changes to pension system aiming to reduce public 
pension expenditures (i.e. phase-out of early retirement). This shows that the austerity 
measures adopted by the governments in the area of pensions affected both the funded and 
PAYG pillars. These cuts may have been greater because of the existence of the multi-pillar 
system and necessity to meet the transition cost.  
The measures taken on changes in funded pillar played a significant role in fiscal 
consolidation process amongst the CEE countries with most radical scope during analysed 
period in the case of Hungary. The sequestration
13
 of pension assets in Hungary improved 
fiscal balance approximately of 10% GDP. In Baltic States, temporary reduction or partial 
reduction of contribution diverted to funded pillar during 2009-2011 improved fiscal position 
by 1.4% GDP in Lithuania, 2.3% GDP in Estonia and 3.2% in Latvia. In Poland permanent 
reduction of contribution to funded part of pension system since May of 2011, brought a 
fiscal effect of 0.6% GDP in 2011. The changes implemented in Poland in 2013 (effective in 
2014) - acquisition of 51.5% of assets of OPF’s, changing the character of pension funds 
from mandatory to voluntary and final constitution of contribution to the funded pillar at 
2.92% of wage further improved current fiscal position. The one-off measure: sequestration 
of T-bonds held by pension funds accounted for 5 pp drop in public debt to GDP ratio in 
2014 and changes in contribution level diverted to OPFs complemented with voluntary 
character of participation accounted for further reduction of transition cost to 0.3 – 0.4% of 
GDP/ 
 
 
                                                 
13
 This expression has been used by B.H. Casey (2014). 
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Table 3. 3. Fiscal position of CEE countries in 2007 - 2014 
Country General Government net lending (+) / net borrowing (-) (% GDP)  
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Bulgaria 1.2 1.7 -4.3 -3.1 -2.0 -0.5 -1.2 -2.8 
Estonia 2.4 -2.9 -2.0 0.2 1.0 -0.3 -0.2 0.6 
Latvia -0.4 -4.2 -9.7 -8.1 -3.4 -0.8 -0.7 -1.4 
Lithuania -1.0 -3.3 -9.4 -7.2 -9.0 -3.2 -2.6 -0.7 
Hungary -5.1 -3.7 -4.6 -4.4 -5.5 -2.3 -2.5 -2.6 
Poland -1.9 -3.7 -7.5 -7.9 -5.0 -3.7 -4.0 -3.2 
Romania -2.9 -5.7 -9.0 -6.8 -5.6 -3.0 -2.1 -1.5 
Slovakia -1.8 -2.1 -8.0 -7.7 -5.1 -4.5 -2.6 -2.9 
Country Government consolidated gross debt (%GDP) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Bulgaria 17.2 13.7 14.6 16.2 16.3 18.5 18.3  27.6 
Estonia 3.7 4.5 7.1 6.7 6.1 9.8 10.1 10.6 
Latvia 9.0 19.8 36.9 44.4 41.9 40.6 38.2 40.0 
Lithuania 16.8 15.5 29.3 37.8 38.3 40.5 38.8 40.8 
Hungary 67.0 73.0 79.8 82.2 82.1 79.8 77.3 76.9 
Poland 45.0 47.1 50.9 54.9 56.2 55.6 55.7 50.1 
Romania 12.8 13.4 23.6 30.5 34.7 37.9 39.0 39.8 
Slovakia 29.6 27.9 35.6 41.0 43.4 52.4 54.6 53.6 
Source: Eurostat. 
As Table 3.1 shows, all the fiscal effort undertaken by the CEE countries led to abrogating of 
excessive deficit procedure as the general government deficit had fallen below 3% of GDP 
and eventual excess (as in the case of Poland) was explained by costs of structural reforms.  
3.2. Financial situation of the PAYG schemes in the CEE countries 
 
Financial situation of mandatory PAYG schemes in the CEE countries prior and after the 
pension reforms differed (see Table 3.4.). Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Latvia 
already had a deficit in the PAYG scheme prior to the reform implementation.  
The situation in Baltic States was more favourable before the implementation of pension 
reforms and let to keep the surplus in public PAYG schemes even after the outflow of the 
part of the old-age contribution to mandatory pension funds.  
After the reform implementation, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia still note the 
deficit in their pension systems, without the transition cost. This is an outcome of 
implemented policies – for example the reduction of general social security contribution in 
Bulgaria (measure to reduce the wage cost) or maintaining low retirement age and pension 
benefits indexation close to wage growth in Poland.  
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Table 3. 4. Current year deficit/surplus of the PAYG schemes as % of GDP before any financial transfers 
to the system from general government and the deficit/surplus of the PAYG schemes less transition costs 
(in brackets)  
Country  
(reform year) 
T-3  T-2  T-1  Reform 
year(T)  
T+1  T+2  T+3  T+4  T+5  T+6  T+7  
Bulgaria (2002)  ..  -0.4  -0.9  -2.0 
(-1.4)  
-2.0 
(-1.5)  
-3.1 
(-2.5)  
-2.6 
(-1.9)  
-2.4 
(-1.6)  
-2.3 
(-1.2)  
-3.6 
(-2.5)  
..  
Estonia  
(2002)  
-0.9  -0.2  0.5  0.6 
(0.6)  
0.2  
(0.6) 
-0.1 
(0.6)  
-0.2 
(0.5)  
-0.2  
(0.6) 
..  ..  ..  
Hungary (1998)  ..  ..  ..  -0.5 
(-0.3)  
-0.7 
(-0.2)  
-0.7 
(-0.2)  
-1.0 
(-0.5)  
-1.8 
(-1.3)  
-1.6 
(-1.1)  
-2.0 
(-1.2)  
-2.3 
(-1.3)  
Latvia  
(2001)  
-0.3  -0.9  -0.6  -0.1  
(0.0) 
0.0  
(0.2) 
0.1 
(0.5)  
0.7 
(1.1)  
0.9 
(1.5)  
1.3 
(2.0)  
..  ..  
Lithuania 
(2004)  
-0.1  0.0  0.3  0.2 
(0.5)  
0.1 
(0.5)  
0.4 
(1.0)  
..  ..  ..  ..  ..  
Poland  
(1999)  
-0.9  -1.3  -1.3  -2.0  
(-1.7) 
-2.3 
(-1.3)  
-2.9 
(-1.8)  
-3.4 
(-2.2)  
-3.4  
(-2.2) 
-3.3 
(-2.2)  
-3.0 
(-1.7)  
-3.3 
(-2.0)  
Slovakia (2005)  -0.4  -0.4  -1.1  -2.2 
(-1.6)  
-2.7 
(-1.6)  
..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  
Note: The reform year (T) takes into account the first effects of the reform. It must be noted that in Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania the mandatory pension funds started mid-year (from July) and in Poland in April. In other 
countries the reform was introduced from January of the respective year. No specific data for Romania. 
Source: Transition Costs of Reformed Pension Systems, Center for Policy Studies PRAXIS, Tallinn 2008, p. 15, 
supplemented with authors’ calculations of current deficit/surplus less transition costs. 
Diverting a part of old-age contribution to mandatory pension funds seriously deepened the 
deficit of PAYG schemes in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. As mentioned before in  
Chapter 1, expected reduction of pensions’ expenditures did not support the coverage of 
transition costs. Moreover, governments of some of analysed countries decided to introduce 
changes into the PAYG schemes that had worsen their financial situation. In Poland for 
example, these decisions included: postponing of early-retirement phase-out, sustaining the 
privileges for miners, changing indexation rules. In Bulgaria, despite of the deficit of PAYG 
scheme, the government decided to gradually reduce the contribution rate to the scheme from 
27% (in 2002) to 11% (in 2010) and then increased it to 12.80% in 2011. 
The results of such decisions are visible in the Table 3.4 in numbers in brackets which 
represents the deficit/surplus of PAYG schemes before the transfer of part of social security 
contribution to funded scheme. In Poland such deficit accounted for 2% of GDP, and slightly 
lower in Bulgaria, Slovak Republic and Hungary. 
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Higher deficit of pension systems after the crisis was thus one of the factors influencing 
decisions to increase pension contribution revenue by reduction of the funded component 
contribution. 
3.3. Quantitative assessment of drivers of after-crisis pension system changes.  
 
To assess the impact of analysed factors on the general government deficit, as one of the key 
indicators of the current fiscal position of the economies, we tested the importance of these 
factors in explaining the level of general government deficit. First, we performed an analysis 
of variance for the pooled data for all countries in calendar years 2000-2011 (Table 3.5). 
In the analysis the variables that were significant (p<5%) included: general government 
spending and social spending
14
 as well as country variables for Estonia and Slovakia. Other 
analysed variables: transition costs (measuring the contribution outflow to the funded pillar), 
calendar year, employment rate and dummy variables for individual countries were not 
significant. 
Table 3. 5. Results of ANOVA – explanatory variable: general government deficit 
 Sum of squares df Mean 
square 
S P-value 
Annual transition cost  18,113 64 ,283 1,533 0,115 
year 835,468 64 13,054 1,451 0,147 
general  government 
spending*** 
2295,199 64 35,862 3,411 0,000 
social spending*** 23138,693 64 361,542 2,152 0,016 
employment rate 20145,778 64 314,778 ,873 0,678 
BG 5,212 64 ,081 1,694 0,069 
EE*** 8,668 64 ,135 2,012 0,025 
LV 7,334 64 ,115 ,966 0,560 
LT 5,751 64 ,090 ,501 0,987 
HU 6,918 64 ,108 ,803 0,764 
RO 7,168 64 ,112 ,896 0,648 
SK*** 8,751 64 ,137 2,133 0,017 
Source: Authors’ analysis. 
Results of the regression model explaining general government deficit based on the pooled 
annual data for all of the countries are shown in Table 3.6. The model shows that transition 
cost and general government spending in the regression have statistically significant 
coefficients as well as dummies for Latvia, Lithuania and Hungary.  
                                                 
14
 For the entire database the correlation between general government spending and social spending is 10%, 
which means that we can use both of the variables in the regression analysis.  
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Table 3. 6. Results of OLS analysis. Dependent variable: general government deficit 
 Coefficient Std. Err. P>t 
transition cost** 1.447 0.710 0.045 
post-crisis year 0.311 0.518 0.550 
general government spending*** 0.702 0.089 0.000 
social spending -0.214 0.232 0.358 
employment rate -0.202 0.111 0.072 
Bulgaria 0.096 1.282 0.941 
Estonia 1.243 1.638 0.450 
Latvia*** 3.822 1.499 0.013 
Lithuania*** 4.116 1.496 0.007 
Hungary*** -3.980 1.248 0.002 
Romania -5.519 5.613 0.329 
Slovakia  14.272 11.270 0.209 
Constant  -13.798 7.388 0.066 
R-squared 0.7462 
Note: Poland is the reference country, *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors’ analysis. 
The results of the regression indicate that higher transition cost and overall level of general 
government spending lead to higher general government deficit.  
Overall, the results of the quantitative analyses indicate that the level of general government 
spending is one of the main drivers of the general government deficit. In the regression model 
we also see the statistically significant impact of transition cost on this level.   
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Chapter 4: Impact of changes in pension system in selected CEE countries 
on the level of pensions and pension wealth
15
 
Agnieszka Chłoń-Domińczak 
 
The impact of the implemented changes will affect cohorts to a different extent, depending on 
their age and time left to retirement age. It is associated with announced changes in 
contribution level over time, as well as with time left to retirement. Currently used micro 
simulations (for example OECD) do not take into account cohort difference, as they focus on 
the new entrants to the pension system. Our approach allows to appropriately assess the 
impact of the implemented changes for various participants of pension systems in the 
countries covered by the project.  
In this chapter, we analyse the microeconomic consequence of pension system changes in the 
CEE countries. We formulate three hypotheses. First: the net change of the entire pension 
wealth depends both on the change in the fully funded part and on the change of pension 
accumulation in the pay-as-you-go part of the system, in order to fully assess the impact of 
the change on pension wealth it is important to analyse the net outcome.  Some authors, for 
instance (Price & Rudolph, 2013) take into account only the reduction of the fully-funded 
part of the pension. Second: the impact of the change is higher in the case of countries where 
the reduction in fully funded contribution level was permanent. Third: the impact of the 
change is higher in the case of younger workers, whose pension rights are accumulated for 
longer time after the change was introduced.  
This hypothesis is associated with changes in contribution level over time as well as with 
time left to retirement. Pension level projections published by the OECD (DG Employment & 
Social Protection Committee, 2012; OECD, 2011b) do not take into account cohort 
difference, as they focus on the new entrants to the pension system. Our approach allows us 
to assess the expected impact of the implemented changes for various participants of pension 
systems in the countries covered by the project.  
For the verification of the abovementioned hypotheses, a microsimulation model is 
developed, in which we calculate the value of pension wealth for two scenarios: before and 
after the pension system change. We take into account both the value of the pension wealth 
                                                 
15
 This is a short summary of the article that has been accepted for publication in the Journal of Pension 
Economics and Finance entitled: Impact of changes in multi-pillar pension systems in CEE countries on 
individual pension wealth, doi:10.1017/S1474747216000238. 
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loss in the funded part, as well as pension wealth gain in the pay-as-you-go part, leading to 
the assessment of the net pension wealth change. In this analysis we take into account those 
participants of the pension system who were already working when the change was 
introduced, taking different ages (from age 30 to 50) as well as different wage levels (from 50 
percent to 150 percent of average wage). 
The microsimulation model covers 5 countries that changed the proportion of contributions 
transferred to funded pillar for a set of “representatives” of pension fund members. We limit 
our analysis to the following countries: Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania and 
Slovakia. We did not take into account Bulgaria, as there was no change in the fully funded 
contribution rate. Due to the applied method, we also don’t perform our analysis for 
Hungary
16
.  
The chapter consists of the following sections. First, we present the change in the level of 
pension replacement rates in three countries that are members of the OECD: Hungary, Poland 
and Slovak Republic, based on the pension projections published in the OECD’s series 
Pensions at a Glance. Second, we outline the time path of the contribution levels to the fully 
funded part in the analysed countries, as the timing of the change and its temporal or 
permanent character affect the level of change in expected pension level.  
4.1. Changes in expected pensions before and after the crisis in the CEE OECD 
countries 
 
Future level of pensions is assessed, among others, by the OECD. The OECD applies the 
microsimulation APEX model to project the future level of pensions relative to wages in the 
OECD countries. Results of such simulations, based on standardised assumptions, are 
published bi-annually in the report „Pensions at a Glance”.  
Table 4.1 presents results of the gross pension level relative to average wage in four 
consecutive reports: from 2007 to 2013 (OECD, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013), i.e. the time from 
before crisis until recent available simulations, which take into account changes in the 
pension systems. As one can see, the reversal of pension reform in Hungary leads to a slight 
reduction in the replacement rate, which still remains higher than average. Pension system 
changes lead in the reduction of the gross replacement rate in Poland, particularly between 
2011 and 2013, i.e. after the reduction of the fully funded contribution rate to 1.92% of wage.  
                                                 
16
 Hungary is not covered by the analysis, due to the applied methodology, which is discussed later in the 
chapter. 
  
57 
Finally, pension system changes in Slovakia lead to the increase of the pension promise to the 
new labour market entrants.  
Table 4. 1. Gross relative pension level of average wage earner of new entrant to the labour market in a 
given year (% of average wage) 
 2007 2009 2011 2013 
Hungary 76.9 76.9 75.8 73.6 
Poland 61.2 61.2 59.0 48.8 
Slovakia 56.7 56.4 57.5 65.9 
Source: (OECD, 2007, 2009, 2011a, 2013). 
4.2. The time path of contribution changes in fully funded schemes  
 
The timing and scale of adjustments of pension contributions in the analysed countries differ, 
following individual decisions made by the countries (Bielawska, Chłoń-Domińczak, & 
Stańko, 2015; Price & Rudolph, 2013; Schwarz & Arias, 2014). The rates of pension 
contribution to the fully funded component between 2000 and 2040 are presented in Figure 
4.1. In the case of Estonia, Lithuania and Romania the change was temporal and after the 
period of adjustment, the contribution rate came back to the initial level. In Estonia, the initial 
reduction between 2009 and 2011 will be compensated by higher contribution rates between 
2014 and 2017. In Romania, the initial path of contribution rate increases was postponed by 
one year, which means that there is a difference of 0.5 percent of wage in contribution 
between initial and post-2008 scenarios between 2009 and 2016.  
An interesting solution was chosen by Lithuania. The contribution rate for fully funded part 
since 2014 was 2 percent from mandatory pension contribution plus 1 percent coming 
additionally from participants’ income and another 1% average wage financed from the state 
budget. Individuals could choose whether they want to remain in fully funded system and pay 
additional contribution, which is matched by the state budget payment from general taxes. 
Since 2016 the contribution mix becomes six percent (i.e. 2+2+2) and since 2020 3.5 percent 
of contribution rate is paid from social insurance plus 2 percent participant wage plus 2 
percent of average wage state budget. While this change increased contribution income to the 
social insurance system, the state budget co-payment means that the level of contributions 
financed from social insurance and other taxes will go back to the initial level. However, 
there is an additional contribution deducted from wage. The participant income part (1 
percent between 2014 and 2019 and 2 percent afterwards) is not included in comparison of 
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pension rights change but it actually increases the level of future pension for individuals, 
increasing the role of fully funded pension income in the old-age.  
Figure 4. 1. Initial and post-2008 fully funded contribution rates in the CEE countries (% of wage) 
a. Estonia b. Latvia 
  
c. Lithuania d. Poland 
 
 
e. Romania f. Slovakia 
  
Source: Author’s analysis based on country sources. 
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Three countries: Latvia, Poland and Slovakia reduced their fully funded contribution rates 
permanently. The long-term decrease is by 4 percentage points in Latvia (from 8 percent to 4 
percent) 4.38 percentage points in Poland (from 7.3 percent to 2.92 percent) and by 5 to 3 
percentage points in Slovakia (from 9 percent to 4 percent and back to 6 percent).  
4.3. Method and assumptions for calculation of net change in pension wealth 
 
In order to calculate the impact of the change on net pension wealth, we construct a 
microsimulation model for each of the analysed countries. We calculate the net change in 
pension wealth by measuring the difference in pension rights in fully funded systems due to 
the contribution decline (reduction of pension wealth) and difference in pension rights in pay-
as-you-go systems due to the increase of the contribution (increase of pension wealth).  
The calculation depends on the type of the pay-as-you-go system and pension rights 
accumulation in a given country, as described in Table 4.2. The resulting change is measured 
as a share of average wage.   
Table 4. 2. Calculation of additional PAYG pension rights in analysed countries 
Country  Additional PAYG pension rights 
Estonia 
 
There are no additional rights granted in the pay-as-you-go system. As the contribution rate was 
initially decreased and increased afterwards to compensate for the change, pension rights in the 
pay-as-you-go system remain unchanged.  
Latvia 
 
Reduced contributions are transferred to the general NDC account of an individual. This account 
is indexed according to wage fund growth. In the simulation, the level of indexation is equal to 
average productivity growth between 2010 and 2060.  
Lithuania  
 
The pay-as-you-go system is a defined benefit scheme. In the case of funded system 
participants, the benefit part that is related to individual earnings is reduced proportionally to the 
contribution rate. It is done by applying a coefficient equal to contribution rate for funded part in 
numerator and full contribution rate for social insurance old-age supplemental part in 
denominator (9.3%). The accrual rate is equal to 0.5% of wage. 
For the calculation of pension right, the difference in correction coefficients is calculated and 
translated into compounded accrual rate for a pension. This value is multiplied by life 
expectancy at the age of 65 in a calendar year where individual reaches the age of 65. For the 
reasons of comparability, the life expectancy is an average of male and female values. The 
comparison of accrued pension rights does not take into account additional contributions that are 
deducted from wage, as it was not a part of the initial pension system.  
Poland 
 
Reduced contributions are transferred to the NDC-2 account in the PAYG system. The gain in 
pension rights is calculated as the accumulated value of contributions paid to the NDC-2 account 
indexed to the 5-year averaged GDP growth. NDC-2 account was established in the Polish 
system after the reduction of initial contribution rates, it has a different indexation factor (NDC 
account is indexed to covered wage bill growth). NDC-2 account balance is inherited and paid 
out in cash in the case of death of pension system participant before claiming retirement.  
Romania 
 
Romania has a point system, in which an average earner accumulates one pension point in the 
case of average working career. For the purpose of the simulation, the length of the average 
career is set at the level of 30 years. The change in the pay-as-you-go pension rights is 
calculated by applying a coefficient equal to fully funded contribution level divided by the total 
social insurance contribution (31.3% of wage). The additional pension point values accumulated 
are equal to the difference in correction coefficient between initial and post-2008 contribution 
rates multiplied by 1/30 (reflecting and accrual of proportion of pension point). The value of 
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Country  Additional PAYG pension rights 
pension point in 2013 was 762.10 lei and is indexed by 50% of average wage growth. The 
accumulated value of pension points between 2009 and age of 65 is multiplied by life 
expectancy at the age of 65 forecasted for a year when individual reaches the age of 65. For the 
reasons of comparability the life expectancy is averaged between men and women (unisex). 
Slovakia 
 
Slovakia has a point system, in which an average earner accumulates one pension point for each 
year of contribution payments. There are solidarity adjustments in the case of people earning 
below and above average wage. The change in the pay-as-you-go pension rights is calculated by 
applying a coefficient equal to fully funded contribution level divided by the total social 
insurance contribution (18% of wage).  
The additional pension point values accumulated are equal to the difference in correction 
coefficient between initial and post-2008 contribution rates. The value of pension point in 2013 
was 10.098 EUR and is indexed by average wage growth. The value of pension points is 
reduced for earnings above 125% of average wage (reduction factor is 60%) and the value of 
pension points for earnings below 100% of average wage are increased by 22%. The 
accumulated value of pension points between 2009 and age of 65 is multiplied by life 
expectancy at the age of 65 forecasted for a year when individual reaches the age of 65. For the 
reasons of comparability the life expectancy is averaged between men and women (unisex). 
Source: Author’s analysis based on information obtained from country experts and (OECD, 2013). 
Assumptions used in the microsimulation are based on the ones used in the 2015 Ageing 
Working Group report (European Commission DG ECFIN, 2015), which are summarised in 
Table 4.3. The wage growth is assumed at the level of average labour productivity growth in 
the period 2010-2060 and the GDP growth as an average GDP growth for the same period. 
The rate of return in the fully funded schemes is set at the level of 3.0% annually. 
Furthermore, we assume that contributions paid to the fully funded scheme have an up-front 
fee equal to 5% of the contribution paid and asset management fee of 0.2% of assets 
annually. Life expectancy assumptions used in the simulation follow Eurostat EUROPOP 
projection from 2013.  
Table 4. 3. Assumptions on GDP, labour productivity growth, financial market rate of return and life 
expectancy at age 65 in the analysed countries 
 GDP 
growth 
Labour 
productivity 
growth 
Financial 
market rate 
of return 
Life expectancy at 65 (in years) 
2025 2035 2045 
Estonia 1.5 2.0  
 
 
3.0 
19.00 20.25 21.40 
Latvia 1.6 2.4 17.75 19.15 20.45 
Lithuania 1.2 2.3 18.30 19.65 20.90 
Poland 1.6 2.2 19.05 20.25 21.45 
Romania 1.6 2.3 17.75 19.05 20.35 
Slovakia 1.5 2.2 18.15 19.45 20.70 
Source: (European Commission DG Economic and Financial Affairs, 2014). 
The assumptions on the financial market rate of return show that the return on the funded part 
will be in all of the countries higher than the wage growth. As shown in Chapter 2, this was 
not the case in the period 2001-2012, mainly due to the negative returns in the time of the 
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Great Recession. Despite this short-term evidence, in the long run the proposed assumptions 
can still be applied. Second, the AWG assumptions assume the same level of efficiency of 
financial market institutions. In our analysis we include the base scenario, which follows the 
same assumption on the financial market rate of return. We also test sensitivity of results to 
the assumption on the fully funded rate of return.  
4.4. Simulation results 
 
The results of the simulation indicate that the individual pension rights change resulting from 
the post-2008 pension system changes differ between Central and Eastern European 
countries.  
The simulations show that in the case of average wage earner in the base scenario in three out 
of six analysed countries, there is almost no difference in pension wealth level. These are 
countries with temporary change of pension contributions: Estonia, Lithuania and Romania. 
This means that a few years’ small diversion from the original path does not influence the 
long-term outcome of pension wealth accumulation during the entire working career.  
Figure 4. 2. Change in the pension wealth due to the post-2008 modification of fully funded contribution 
rates for average wage earners 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
The impact of the change leads to more significant alterations in pension wealth in countries 
with permanent modifications: Poland, Latvia and Slovakia. In Poland, the reduced 
contributions are diverted into NDC-2 account, indexed by average GDP growth. As assumed 
rate of return in fully funded component is higher than NDC-2 rate of return, there is a loss of 
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pension wealth, resulting from difference in accumulated return. The same is seen in Latvia, 
where the financial market rate of return is higher than the wage growth (2.4 %).  
The loss is higher for the younger people, who have longer expected time of pension wealth 
accumulation after the change. By the same token, the loss measured by pension wealth 
changes with the wage level.  
In the case of Slovakia, the calculation of pension points with target accrual rate of around 
1.25% indicates that the pay-as-you-go part of the pension system offers currently higher 
pension rights for the contribution paid compared to the fully funded component. As a result, 
there is an observed gain in pension wealth due to the reduction of contribution paid to the 
fully funded component. The impact of the change for lower income earners is almost similar 
to those who earn average wage, which shows the impact of the redistribution included in the 
pay-as-you-go formula. Those who earn half of average wage can expect their pension wealth 
increased (compared to their individual wage) level around two times higher than average 
wage earners. The pension wealth increase for those high earners is the smallest. The result 
for Slovakia indicates potential imbalances in the pay-as-you-go part in the future.  
If the rates of return in fully funded scheme are higher, the change would lead to pension 
wealth losses (with exception of Slovakia), while with the lower efficiency of pension funds, 
there is a potential gain in 4 countries with (minor) losses in Estonia and Romania.  
4.5. Conclusions 
The multi-pillar systems changes in Central and Eastern Europe, according to our assessment, 
will have relatively small impact on the value of future old-age pensions, in particular in 
countries that decided to make the contribution change temporary. The permanent change 
leads to observable change in the pension wealth level, which direction depends on the design 
of the PAYG system. .  
Our findings should be seen only as one of the outcomes of the recent wave of pension 
systems changes. One should not forget that the change in the proportion of contributions 
affects the risk diversification of financing future pensions.  
The changes also resulted in a loss of society’s trust towards state-organised pension system 
and reliability of accumulated pension savings. Recent modifications in funded systems 
increased the reliance of future pension income on wage-based financing, which will be more 
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difficult to achieve given projected labour supply shortages due to the population ageing in 
the future.  
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Chapter 5: Long-term impact of changes in mandatory funded systems in 
selected CEE countries on the stability of public finances and pension 
systems 
Kamila Bielawska, Agnieszka Chłoń-Domińczak 
In this chapter we analyse the results of long-term projections of pension expenditure, 
including the impact of various factors such as: changes in demographic structure (population 
ageing), changes in retirement age, changes in benefit levels and sources of financing 
(division between pay-as-you-go and funded parts of the system). We also look at the 
sustainability measures of public finances related to the population ageing.  
Research methods used: 
 desk research and collection of results of pension projections in the analysed 
countries, including results published in the Ageing Reports published by the Ageing 
Working Group in 2009, 2012 and 2015; 
 secondary quantitative analysis of the collected data, as well as analysis of the 
consistency of the projection results obtained from various sources.  
5.1. Ageing and fiscal sustainability on the European Union agenda 
The issue of long-term sustainability of public finances in the EU became more important 
when the decision about creation of the monetary union was taken. Focusing on the long-term 
assessment of the functioning of social security systems was reflected in the establishment of 
the Ageing Working Group of the Economic Policy Committee (AWG/EPC) in 1999. First 
demographic projections and their impact on public spending associated with an ageing 
population (ageing-related public expenditures) were published by the AWG in 2001. The 
EU summit in Stockholm in 2001 adopted a strategy to strengthen the long-term 
sustainability of public finances due to the ageing population, based on three measures 
(Oksanen 2009, p. 12): 
a) the rapid reduction of public debt, 
b) an increase in employment and labour productivity, 
c) review, and where necessary, reforming public pension systems, health and long-term 
care.  
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From that moment analysis of the impact of public expenditure related to demographic 
change on the sustainability of public finance has become a permanent action taken at the EU 
level. 
Every three years since 2006, a set of reports covering the issue of impact of ageing on public 
finances has been published. As the first one arrives the Joint Report prepared by the 
European Commission (DG ECFIN) and the Economic Policy Committee (AWG) on 
Underlying Assumptions and Projection Methodologies for the exercise of age-related 
expenditure projections. It covers demographic and economic assumptions which are crucial 
to evaluate public programs connected with ageing. This methodological report is followed 
by the Ageing Report: Economic and budgetary projections for the EU Member States, which 
covers the long-term projections of age-related public spending in the area of pensions, health 
care, long-term care, education and unemployment benefits (further called Ageing Report). 
On the basis of this report the Fiscal Sustainability Report is presented, which assess the 
medium and long-term fiscal stability of EU Member States in light of ageing populations. 
The long-term stability of public finances became a part of MSs’ stability or convergence 
programs (SCPs's) presented annually to the European Commission and ECOFIN Council to 
assess the compliance of national fiscal policies with the EU regulations. Every implemented 
structural reform needs to be assessed in terms of medium and long-term stability of public 
finances and presented in SCPs. 
In fact, for many years these forward-looking projections had no practical influence on 
current evaluation of fiscal stance. According to the Maastricht Treaty member states were 
expected to avoid excessive deficits (ex post nominal deficit of general government sector 
less than 3% of GDP) and keep the gross public debt below 60% of GDP or reduce it 
gradually. 
The situation changed when Sweden and several Central and Eastern European countries 
introduced structural pension reforms implementing multi-pillar systems that include 
a mandatory, fully funded pillar. This type of structural pension reform makes public finance 
sustainable in long run, but causes a pressure on fiscal balance in short and medium term. 
According to the Eurostat Decision on Classification of funded pension schemes and impact 
on government finance (Eurostat, 2004), neither contributions diverted from the PAYG pillar 
to mandatory pension funds, nor assets of pension funds invested in T-bonds, could be taken 
into account when calculating the public deficit and debt. To smooth the difference in 
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government accounts between reformers and non-reformers, the Stability and Growth Pact 
reform of 2005 allowed transition costs to be taken into account on a linear regressive basis 
for a transitory period of five years if the general government deficit remained close to the 
value of 3% of GDP (Council Regulation (EC) No 1056/2005). Transitory period ended when 
economic crisis hit the economies of European countries. In 2010 reformers renewed a 
request to the European Commission to redefine GGS deficit and debt excluding public 
spending related to creation of funded component of pension systems (Égert, 2013). 
However, the request was accommodated by the regulation during the second reform of 
Stability and Growth Pact in 2011, effective in 2012 evaluation round of SCPs, when most of 
the analysed countries had already decided on changes to the funded pillar of pension 
systems. 
5.2. Projections of pension expenditures based on Ageing Reports 
In this section we analyse projections of pension expenditure in three consecutive ageing 
reports: from 2009, 2012 and 2015. In that way we compare, how the projections evolved 
given the change of pension systems as well as underlying assumptions that took place 
between 2007 and 2013.  
AWG projections show heterogeneity in the level and changes in pension expenditure in the 
CEE countries. As discussed in Chapter 1 and in Figure 5.1A, the level of pension 
expenditure in the CEE countries increased between 2007 and 2010, while between 2010 and 
2013 it declined (except Bulgaria and Slovakia). Pension projections for year 2060 Ageing 
Reports (Figure 5.1 B and C) show that many countries implemented measures that aim to 
reduce the future pension expenditure. In 2009 and 2012 Ageing Reports (European 
Commission DG ECFIN, 2009, 2012) the pension expenditure projections indicate the rise in 
expenditure level by 2060 in five countries: Bulgaria, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania and 
Slovakia. However, already in 2012 the projected increase was smaller in Bulgaria, Lithuania 
and Romania. According to the last Ageing Report (European Commission DG ECFIN, 
2015) in all countries (except Slovakia) pension expenditure will decline by 2060. The 
decrease in pension expenditure was projected already from 2009 in Estonia, Latvia and 
Poland – in the two latter countries this was the result of the shift to the NDC system in the 
public pay-as-you-go component. In Latvia and Poland the decline in pension expenditure in 
2015 Ageing Report is smaller compared to the 2012 Ageing Report.   
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Figure 5. 1. Actual pension expenditure and projected level of pension expenditure in Ageing Reports 
A. Actual pension expenditure in base year (% GDP) B. Projected pension expenditure in 2060 (% 
GDP) 
  
C. Change in pension expenditure between base year and 2060 
 
D. Private pension expenditure in 2060 (% GDP) E. Public and private expenditure in 2060 (% 
GDP) 
  
Source: European Commission DG ECFIN (2009, 2012, 2015). 
Pension system changes and reduction of the size of funded components also leads to the 
changes in the projected levels of private pension expenditure (Figure 5.1 D). Ageing Reports 
present these projections for six countries (with exception of Bulgaria and Slovakia). The 
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private pension expenditure in the 2015 Ageing Report will be smaller, compared to the 2009 
Ageing Report in all countries, with exception of Estonia. Due to the reversal of funded 
systems, in Poland and Hungary there will be no private pension expenditure projected in 
2060. If we add both public and private pension expenditure (Figure 5.1 E), we can see that 
the total pension expenditure will increase in Estonia (i.e. the private pension expenditure 
will be higher than the decline projected in public spending), while the decline will be smaller 
in Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. It is also worth to note that in the case of Poland, 
the combined public and private pension spending is relatively constant at the level of 10% of 
GDP. This indicates that the increase in projected level of public expenditure in consecutive 
Ageing Reports is due to the reduction of the role of the funded component in the mandatory 
pension system.  
The decomposition of change in pension expenditure included in the Ageing Reports allows 
identifying what the contribution of demographic and pension system changes is to the 
overall evolution in pension expenditure. This includes, in particular: 
 dependency ratio contribution, which indicates what would be the increase of pension 
expenditure caused by the change in population age structure; 
 coverage ratio contribution, which measures the ratio of pensioners to the population 
65+; this means that it presents the effects of changes in pensionable age; 
 benefit ratio contribution; which shows the effect of benefit level changes (relative to 
average wage) to the change of overall pension expenditure.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, population ageing is the main long-term reason that triggered 
reforms of pension systems in the CEE countries. The demographic developments leading to 
changes in the age structure continue for the past two decades. Thus, the dependency ratio 
contribution to potential increase of pension expenditure is significant in the CEE countries 
(Figure 5.2).  
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Figure 5. 2. Contribution of the dependency ratio effect to the change in public pension expenditure (in 
p.p. of GDP) 
 
Source: European Commission DG ECFIN (2009, 2012, 2015). 
The dependency ratio contribution to the change of pension expenditure is the highest in 
Poland and Slovakia, while the lowest in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Bulgaria. As 
presented in Chapter 1, these four countries maintain relatively higher level of fertility, which 
contributes to the size of the working age population as projected in 2060. This indicates that 
there is a significant contribution of the current demographic developments to the ageing 
expenditure pressure in the next decades.   
The other two analysed factors contributing to the change in pension expenditure are related 
to the changes of pension systems, which aim to reduce the increase of spending caused by 
the population ageing. The first one is the coverage ratio change, which shows how the 
change in retirement age contributes to the decline of pension expenditure by 2060.  
According to the 2015 Ageing Report, the coverage ratio contributes to the decline of pension 
spending from 1.4% of GDP in Latvia to 5.2% of GDP in Poland (Figure 5.3). This 
contribution depends on the level of change of pensionable age as well as the initial level of 
pension expenditure. In Latvia, the retirement age of men and women is 62 and according to 
the 2015 Ageing Report it will increase to 65, with early retirement possible from age 63. In 
Poland, retirement age will increase from 65.3 for men and 60.3 for women to 67.  
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Figure 5. 3. Contribution of the coverage ratio effect to the change in public pension expenditure (in p.p. 
of GDP) 
 
Source: European Commission DG ECFIN (2009, 2012, 2015). 
The contribution of the benefit ratio effect to the mitigation of pension expenditure increase is 
the highest in Poland and Latvia (Figure 5.4); consistently in the all analysed Ageing Reports. 
This can be linked to the NDC formula in the pay-as-you-go pension system. The 2015 report 
assessment indicates that benefit ratio contributes to the reduction of pension expenditure 
until 2060 by 5.2 p.p. of GDP in Poland and 4.7 p.p. of GDP in Latvia. In the remaining 
countries this effect ranges from almost 1 p.p. of GDP in Lithuania to 3.8 pp. of GDP in 
Estonia. In half of the CEE countries the benefit ratio effect is higher than the EU average 
(3.0 p.p. of GDP). 
Figure 5. 4. Contribution of the benefit ratio effect to the change in public pension expenditure (in p.p. of 
GDP) 
 
Source: European Commission DG ECFIN (2009, 2012, 2015). 
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In conclusion, the introduction of multi-pillar pension system is not a necessary condition for 
the stabilisation of pension expenditure in the long run. The effect of changes in retirement 
age as well as in public pension levels is also important. These changes, together with the 
shift of part of pension system liabilities to funded systems, contribute to the projected 
decline in pension expenditure in the analysed seven countries by 2060.  
5.3. Assessment of fiscal sustainability 
The analysis of fiscal sustainability in the EU takes into account the capacity of public 
authorities to provide servicing the public debt in the long term. In other words, it is assumed 
that fiscal policy is not sustainable, if it leads to an excessive public debt and ever-increasing 
debt service. Ensuring the sustainability of public finances means avoiding excessive growth 
of public debt, which is a burden for future generations. This should be achieved upon the 
condition that the State is able to provide citizens with access to public and social services, 
even in adverse economic conditions and that the challenges associated with an ageing 
populations were taken into account. Measures of sustainability of public finances used in the 
Fiscal Stability Reports are called S1 and S2 indicators. In a recent report (of 2012) they were 
complemented with S0 indicator that shows the risk of fiscal pressure in the short term. In 
this research the authors focus on indicators S1 and S2. The meaning and interpretation of 
indicators is presented in Table 5.1, components of indicators - in Table 5.2. 
S1 and S2 indicators are calculated on the basis of unchanged policies over time, which 
means that any structural change acting on the balance and debt of public sector debt entails 
changes in their value. 
In the current Fiscal Sustainability Report of 2012, the input data for the assessment of long-
term public finances of Member States come from the autumn economic forecasts of the 
European Commission. Therefore they are burdened with larger, than usual, level of 
forecasting risk. Difficulties arise, among others, from the uncertainty of formation of 
potential GDP and the output gap. In particular, attention should be paid to the fact that the 
primary structural balance (cyclically adjusted balance less of debt servicing expenses) was 
adjusted in recent years at a much greater rate than the average in the decade that preceded 
the occurrence of the fiscal crisis. The path of fiscal consolidation carried out by EU 
countries in 2009-2013 seems questionable to continue in future periods. 
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Table 5. 1. General characteristic of S1 and S2 indicators 
Indicator Meaning Interpretation 
of values 
S1 –  
Medium-term 
sustainability 
indicator 
(up to 2030) 
Shows the upfront adjustment effort required, in terms of steady 
improvement in the structural primary balance to be introduced until 
2020, and then sustained for a decade, to bring debt ratios back to 60% 
of GDP in 2030, including financing for any additional expenditure 
until the target date, arising from an ageing population  
 
S1 < 0 – low 
risk 
0 < S1 < 3 – 
medium risk 
S1 > 3 – high 
risk 
 
S2 –  
Long-term 
sustainability 
indicator  
(indefinite 
horizon) 
Shows the adjustment to the current structural primary balance 
required to fulfil the infinite horizon inter-temporal budget constraint, 
including paying for any additional expenditure arising from an ageing 
population. 
S2 < 2 – low 
risk 
2 < S2 < 6 – 
medium risk 
S2 > 6 – high 
risk 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on Fiscal Sustainability Report (2012). 
Table 5. 2. Components of S1 and S2 indicators 
Indicator / 
components 
Required adjustment 
given the initial 
budgetary position 
(IBP) 
 Required adjustment 
to reach debt to GDP 
ratio of 60% in 2030 
(DR) 
 Required adjustment due to 
cost of ageing (CoA) 
S1 = Gap to debt-stabilizing 
primary balance in 2020 
through a steady gradual 
adjustment 
+ Additional adjustment 
required to reach a debt 
target of 60% of GDP 
in 2030 
+ Additional adjustment required 
to finance the increase in public 
expenditure due to ageing 
population up to 2030 
S2 = Gap to debt-stabilizing 
primary balance 
+ 0 + Additional adjustment required 
to finance the increase in public 
expenditure due to ageing 
population  over an infinite 
horizon 
Source: Fiscal Sustainability Report (2012, p. 19). 
Among analysed countries, three were characterized by a medium risk of sustainability of 
public finances in 2030 (Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia). The main reason for greater fiscal 
effort necessary to improve the stability was predicted up to 2030 due to an increase in age-
related public expenditures. In the case of Poland and Slovakia, S1 indicator does not include 
the permanent reduction of mandatory funded pillar, which should, within the forecast 
horizon, contribute to a decline in the value of S1 (Table 5.3). 
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Table 5. 3. S1 values and its components for the CEE countries 
Country Risk S1 IBP DR CoA 
Bulgaria low -1.5 -0.1 -2.3   0.8 
Estonia low -3.4 -0.4 -3.0   0.2 
Latvia low -2.0 -0.3 -0.9 -0.8 
Lithuania medium   0.3   0.8 -1.1   0.7 
Hungary low -0.4 -0.2   0.9 -1.3 
Poland medium   0.1 -0.3 -0.2   0.6 
Romania low -1.4 -0.4 -1.4   0.4 
Slovakia medium   2.2   1.1 -0.2   1.3 
EU 27 x   1.8 -0.4   1.7   0.4 
Where: 
IBP – initial budgetary position 
DR - required adjustment to reach debt to GDP ratio of 60% in 2030 
Co - required adjustment due to cost of ageing  
Source: Authors’ analysis based on Fiscal Sustainability Report (2012). 
For other countries, the value of S1 indicates a low level of risk of fiscal stability up to 2030, 
although the situation in individual countries varies. For example, in Bulgaria the expected 
increase in age-related expenditures in 2030 was eliminated by low level of public debt, and 
thus left more “fiscal space” to finance the increased spending. Generally, low debt levels in 
relation to GDP of analysed CEE countries compared to the EU average means that in the 
medium term a significant fiscal adjustment is not required (except Slovakia).  
The long-term fiscal sustainability of CEE countries showed greater variation (Table 5.4). 
Only one of the analysed countries, that is Slovakia, was qualified to the group of countries 
with a high risk of loss of fiscal stability, which resulted from the expected increase in 
expenditure on pensions (the highest among the surveyed countries and more than three times 
the average for the EU-27). The S2 indicator for Slovakia did not account for the reduction of 
contributions to pension funds and changes in rules of participation in the funded pillar of 
pension system, as well as other changes to the PAYG part of the system (such as linking the 
retirement age with an average duration of life, and reduction of the indexation of benefits). 
Additional factor was the highest fiscal effort associated with the stabilization of the public 
debt (the largest in the group of countries surveyed and more than three times higher than the 
average in the EU-27). 
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Table 5. 4. The risk of loss of fiscal stability in the infinite horizon in the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe 
Country Risk S2 IBP  
(initial 
budgetary 
position) 
LTC  
(long-term cost 
of ageing): 
of which 
change in 
pension 
expenditures 
Bulgaria medium   2.8 0.5   2.3   1.6 
Estonia low   1.2 0.5   0.7 -0.1 
Latvia low -0.7 0.7 -1.5 -1.4 
Lithuania medium   4.7 0.9   3.8   3.0 
Hungary low   0.5 0.1   0.3 -0.2 
Poland low   1.5 0.4   1.1 -0.6 
Romania medium   3.7 0.1   3.6   2.4 
Slovakia high   6.9 1.8   5.1   3.5 
EU27 x   2.6 0.5   2.2   1.1 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on Fiscal Sustainability Report (2012). 
Table 5. 5. Fiscal stability of CEE countries according to the preliminary forecasts of the 2014 
Country Medium-term risk  S1 Long-term risk S2 
Bulgaria Low -1.2 Medium   3.4 
Estonia Low -2.8 Low   0.1 
Latvia Low -2.4 Low -0.1 
Lithuania Medium -> low -1.0 Medium   3.1 
Hungary Low -0.8 Low   0.6 
Poland medium -> low 0.2 Low -0.8 
Romania Low -0.5 Medium   4.4 
Slovakia medium -> low -0.1 High ->medium   4.3 
Source: Identifying fiscal sustainability challenges in the areas of pension, health care and long-term care 
policies, European Economy, Occasional Papers 201, October 2014. 
Three out of eight CEE countries studied were classified as medium risk of long-term fiscal 
stability (Bulgaria, Lithuania and Romania). The main reason for this was the expected 
increase in pension expenditure. Bulgaria, still maintaining the funded pillar, in 2012, 
introduced a number of changes that will reduce fiscal pressure in the long term: acceleration 
of the increase in retirement age for men and women since 2012 instead of 2021, less 
generous indexation of pensions and extending the period of entitlement to pensions for 
uniformed services. 
In 2014, the European Commission has prepared a preliminary assessment of medium- and 
long-term sustainability of public finances, taking into account most of changes in mandatory 
pension systems, including the rate of contribution and participation in funded pillar. The 
results of preliminary estimates are shown in Table 5.5. 
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Changes to the funded pillar of pension systems helped improve the fiscal stability measured 
by S1 and S2 indicators in analysed countries, both in the medium and long term. However, it 
should be noted that in most of the CEE countries, the effect of the increase in public pension 
expenditures related to the acquisition of all or a part of the contributions from the second 
pillar will emerge in the years beyond the forecast horizon (after 2060). The 2015 Ageing 
Report supports the European Commission preliminary assessment of S1 and S2 indicators as 
of 2014. The forthcoming Fiscal Sustainability Report (2015) should reflect positive changes 
in public finances stability at least over 2060 horizon. 
5.3. Long-term sustainability gap 
Another way to measure the long-term public debt burden in the analysed economies is the 
development of the Sustainability Gap. This indicator presents the actual level of the past, 
present and future debts, measured as a sum of the existing general government debt, the 
government deficit and the implicit debt. The Sustainability Gap is regularly assessed by 
Raffelhuschen and Mogg (2014 and earlier).  
As shown in Figure 5.5 (panel B) the level of the Sustainability Gap between 2012 and 2015 
increased in Bulgaria, Estonia, Poland and Romania. This increase was mainly driven by the 
rise of the implicit debt (panel A). When looking at the level of the Sustainability Gap, we 
see that countries that introduced permanent reductions of their funded pension system 
components belong to the group with higher level of this indicator (Slovakia, Poland, and 
Hungary).  
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Figure 5. 5. Level of public liabilities   
A. Implicit Debt B. Sustainability Gap 
  
Note: the assessment does not take into account changes in pension systems that were reported and projected in 
the 2015 AWG Report 
Source: Raffelhuschen and Mogg (2014 and earlier).  
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Chapter 6: Recommendations for new fiscal rules: how to balance fiscal 
considerations with the social policy needs? 
Kamila Bielawska, Agnieszka Chłoń-Domińczak 
As shown in previous chapters, the introduction of multi-pillar schemes was not the main 
cause of the worsening situation of public finances in the Central and Eastern European 
countries. The reduction of the role of funded pillars was seen as a way to piggy-bank from 
assets accumulated in the funded pillar, despite the positive long-term and medium-term 
effects which were associated with the multi-pillar reforms (Casey, 2014) 
In this chapter we present a theoretical proposal to modify existing fiscal rules applied in the 
EU. Our goal is to propose changes that correspond to the challenges to the sustainability of 
public finances in the long term caused by demographic changes and economic development.  
Research methods used in this task include: 
 synthesis of research results and critical analysis of fiscal rules proposed so far; 
 interviews with experts of public finance and pension systems; 
 testing of formulated proposal of fiscal rules in the selected countries from the 
perspective of their adequacy to ensuring long-term sustainability of public finances.  
6. 1. The nature of the fiscal policy rules  
The fiscal policy rule can be defined as permanent limitation imposed of the fiscal policy by 
introducing the simple numerical limit for a given fiscal aggregate (Kopits, Symansky, 1998, 
p. 2). 
The role of fiscal aggregates can be performed by the following economic indicators: the 
balance of the general government sector (e.g. nominal, structural, and primary)
17
, debt 
(gross, net), public spending (total, current, and primary), public revenues (total, taxes). 
Limits on fiscal aggregates can be specified for example by setting the nominal or real value 
of the aggregate, the dynamics of its changes (increase/decrease in nominal or real terms) in 
relation to another variable, e.g. GDP. Selection of the aggregate and its quantitative 
determination depends on the objectives of fiscal policy (Table 6. 1). 
                                                 
17
 Nominal (overall) balance– accounting difference between revenues and expenditures of GG sector, or on 
memorial basis net lending/net borrowing of GG sector. Structural balance – hypothetical balance that would 
occur in the situation of economic equilibrium (nominal balance plus/minus results of business cycle); it reflects 
the discretionary fiscal policy. Primary balance - the balance minus actual public debt servicing costs. 
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Table 6. 1. Properties of different types of fiscal rules against key objectives 
Type of fiscal rule Fiscal policy objectives* 
Debt sustainability Economic stabilization Government size 
Overall balance ++ - 0 
Primary balance + - 0 
Cyclically adjusted balance ++ ++ 0 
Balanced budget over the cycle ++ +++ 0 
Public debt-to-GDP ratio +++ - - 
Expenditure + ++ ++ 
Revenue    
   Revenue ceilings - - ++ 
   Revenue floors  + + - 
   Limits on revenue windfalls + ++ ++ 
*Positive signs (+) indicate stronger property, negative signs (-) indicate weaker property, zeros (0) indicate 
neutral property with regard to objective. 
Source: Kumar et al. (2009). 
Initially, fiscal rules were applied to ensure macroeconomic stability and limit the expansion 
of the public sector. To realize that objective rules, imposing limits on the size of the revenue 
or public spending in relation to GDP is appropriate. 
Nowadays, greater importance is attached to pursuing a sustainable fiscal policy, which is an 
essential element supporting economic growth in the long term. Therefore, frequently used 
rules are the ones that regard to GG balances and public debt. 
The basic prerequisites of fiscal policy conduct through fiscal rules should include reducing 
the tendency of governments to excessive deficit (deficit bias) and the pro-cyclical budgetary 
policies
18
. 
The efficiency of fiscal policy conducted with the use of fiscal rules depends not only on their 
design (selection of fiscal aggregate and its limitations), but also the issues associated with 
applying rules. Transparency of the entire public finance sector plays also an important role, 
thanks to which it is not possible i.e. to use “creative accounting" in order to circumvent the 
rules. 
  
                                                 
18 More on this subject can be found in: Alesina and Perotti (1994) and von Hagen (2005). 
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The most frequently qualities that should characterize good fiscal rules mentioned in the 
literature are the following
19
: 
i. precise fiscal aggregate, on which limits are set, 
ii. flexibility – responding to changes in the economy, 
iii. simplicity –construction of the rule is understandable for the public, 
iv. compliance with the objectives of fiscal and broader economic policy in at least the 
medium term, 
v. appropriate legal framework for the fiscal rule to insure durability, 
vi. precise rules for monitoring compliance with fiscal rules (preferably by independent 
institutions / entities) 
vii. precise determination of penalties for failure to comply with fiscal rules and their 
severity (cost of breaking a rule higher than benefits) and their inevitability 
(automaticity of sanctions) 
The lack of any of the above mentioned features my result in the inefficiency of fiscal rule in 
question. 
6. 2. Fiscal rules in the EU 
6.2.1 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) stipulates that actions of the Member 
States’ should include the coordination of economic policies. Thus, the basic point of 
reference for assessing the degree of coordination of national budgetary policies has become 
a quantitative verification of budgetary criteria, which includes two indicators:. the public 
sector deficit (general government - GG) according to the EDP (excessive deficit procedure) 
methodology in relation to GDP, and accumulated (explicit) debt (general government gross 
debt) in relation to GDP.  
These solutions disciplining budgetary policies of the Member States were included in the 
Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) signed in 1992 and in the accompanying 
"Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure". According to the provisions of the Treaty, 
Member States should avoid excessive deficits and the European Commission should monitor 
the development of the budgetary situation and the amount of public debt in the Member 
States in order to detect errors. 
                                                 
19 Extensive studies in this area are present for example in Kopits and Symansky (1998), Kumar et al. (2009), 
Anderson and Minarik (2006), Kopits (2001), or von Hagen (2002). 
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Article 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (formerly Article 104 
TEC, 1992), in conjunction with Protocol No. 12 to the TEC, defines the excessive deficit 
procedure. It adopts the principle of avoiding excessive deficits and emphasizes competence 
in overseeing development of the budgetary situation and the amount of debt allocated to the 
European Commission. The Commission evaluates compliance with budgetary discipline by 
the EU member states using two assessment criteria:  
1. Whether the ratio of planned or actual public deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) 
exceeds a reference value, unless:  
a. The ratio has declined substantially and continuously and has reached a level that 
comes close to the reference value, or  
b. Exceeding the reference value is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio 
remains close to the reference value.  
2. Whether the ratio of public debt to gross domestic product exceeds a reference value, 
unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a 
satisfactory pace.  
The excessive deficit procedure is set forth in details in Protocol No. 12 [OJ EU C 83, 
30.03.2010]. Article 1 of the Protocol adopts two benchmarks:  
1. 3% for the ratio of the planned or actual budget deficit to GDP at market prices and,  
2. 60% for the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product at market prices.  
The way of determining whether the rules meet the criteria of a good fiscal rule apply in 
terms of: the method of determining the rules, clarifying the conditions justifying excess the 
reference values and the lack of automatism in applying sanctions (which was exemplified by 
Germany and France in 2003-2005). 
6.2.2 Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was adopted in 1997 to strengthen the fiscal position of 
the Member States. The Pact from a formal point of view consists of a declaration and two 
regulations. The first of Regulations - No 1466/97 - referred to as preventive arm of the Pact, 
the second - No 1467/97 as part of the corrective arm of the Pact (and clarifies the Excessive 
Debt Procedure, EDP).  
The Stability and Growth Pact establishes a framework for coordinating fiscal policies in the 
member states. The European Council, the Council of the European Union, and the European 
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Commission oblige the EU member states to implement the principles of the SGP in a direct 
and timely manner. The Pact specifies elements of prevention (preventive arm) and 
dissuasion (remedial, corrective arm), while accepting the need to respect the medium-term 
objective (MTO). As part of the preventive arm, member states are obliged to submit annual 
stability or convergence programs and take corrective actions to achieve the objectives set out 
in these programs. European Commission has two policy instruments hindering the 
occurrence of excessive deficits (Dziemianowicz and Kargol-Wasiluk, 2015):  
1. Warning to the EU Council, on a proposal from the European Commission  
2. Recommendation of the European Commission addressed to the member states to 
respect their obligations under the Stability and Growth Pact. 
The preventive arm of the Pact imposed, for all EU’s countries, an additional fiscal rule 
which refers to the medium-term budgetary policy and its medium term objective - MTO. 
MTO should be close to balance or in surplus in the medium term. Respecting this rule would 
allow the operation of automatic stabilizers and provide an adequate safety margin in case of 
deterioration of economic situation. The long-term sustainability of public finances was not 
taken into account in assessing the fiscal situation in the original version of the Pact. 
During the first reform of SGP in March 2005 changes in both arms: preventive and 
corrective were implemented. It was decided (Council Regulation (EC) No 1055/2005), that 
MTO should be different for each country, depending on the initial level of public debt and 
potential GDP; (the measure which fit MTO is cyclically adjusted balance of the GG sector 
(CAB) less the one-off and temporary measures). 
MTO's established in 2005, ranged from -1% of GDP for countries with low public debt and 
high growth potential and to balance or surplus of 1% of GDP for countries with high debt 
and low growth potential. Minimum annual step towards achieving the MTO was specified as 
0.5 percentage point of GDP, but without the sanction for the conduct of fiscal policy 
contrary to the MTO. 
The requirement was introduced to present a long-term public finance situation by informing 
at the Stabilisation/Convergence Programmes (SCP’s) of expenditure related to age (age-
related public expenditure) in the long term based on forecasts of AWG. 
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In 2009 the change in the calculation of MTO was instituted so as to take into account the 
changes in implicit liabilities stemming from an aging population (Marchewka-Bartkowiak 
2012). The MTO design is presented in Frame 6.1. 
In corrective arm, while assessing the balance of general government sector, among others, 
effects of structural reforms involving the capitalization of part of the compulsory pension 
contributions were taken into account. To smooth the difference in government accounts for 
reformers and non-reformers, the net transition costs can be taken into account on a linear 
regressive basis for a transitory period of 5 years and only where the deficit remains close to 
the reference value of 3% GDP (Council Regulation (EC) No 1056/2005) In practice the 
excess of reference value may be not higher than 0.5% GDP. A question of relation by 
explicit and implicit public debt was not addressed. 
Frame 6.1. Calculating MTO 
 
The country-specific MTOs should take into account three components:  
i) the debt-stabilizing balance for a debt ratio equal to the (60% of GDP) reference value 
(dependent on long-term potential growth), implying room for budgetary manoeuvre for 
Member States with relatively low debt; 
ii) a supplementary debt-reduction effort for Member States with a debt ratio in excess of 
the (60% of GDP) reference value, implying rapid progress towards it; and 
iii) a fraction of the adjustment needed to cover the present value of future increase in age-
related government expenditure. 
according to the formula: 
 
𝑀𝑇𝑂 = max⁡(𝑀𝑇𝑂𝐼𝐿𝐷,𝑀𝑇𝑂𝑀𝐵,𝑀𝑇𝑂𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜 𝐸𝑅𝑀2⁄ ) 
 
where the components 𝑀𝑇𝑂𝑀𝐵 and 𝑀𝑇𝑂𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜 𝐸𝑅𝑀2⁄  refer to the “minimum benchmark” as agreed by 
the EFC and to the Pact obligation for euro area Member States and Member States participating in 
ERM II to have an MTO not lower than -1% of GDP, respectively, while the component 𝑀𝑇𝑂𝐼𝐿𝐷 
relates to explicit and implicit liabilities: 
 
𝑀𝑇𝑂𝐼𝐿𝐷 = 𝐵𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡−𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔(60%⁡𝑜𝑓𝐺𝐷𝑃) + 𝛼 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡−𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
 
The first term on the right-hand side is the budgetary balance that would stabilize the debt ratio at 
60% of GDP. The second term is the budgetary adjustment that would cover an agreed fraction* of 
the present value of the increase in the age related expenditure Alternatively, Member States can 
choose a fraction of the cost of ageing corresponding to the pre-financing of age-related expenditure 
up to an agreed number of years before the end of the AWG projections. The third term represents a 
supplementary debt-reduction effort, specific to countries with gross debt above 60% of GDP.  
 
* 33% of age- related expenditures in 2040. 
Source: EC 2012, Specifications on the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact and Guidelines on the 
format and content of Stability and Convergence Programmes. 
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The financial and economic crisis of 2007-09 renewed the pressure on public finances. In 
result the countries of CEE region submitted jointly in 2010 another request to the 
Commission to redefine the general government deficit and debt by excluding public 
spending related to the creation of second pillars (as liabilities are explicitly recognized) so as 
not to discourage countries from sustaining funded parts of their pension systems. The 
request was turned down (Egert 2012). 
Second reform of Stability and Growth Pact was a part of strengthening the economic 
governance in the EU during 2011- 2013 (the so-called six-pack, two-pack and fiscal 
compact).  
In the preventive arm a decision on maintaining a differentiated MTOs (albeit with a smaller 
deficit limit for euro zone countries, i.e. 0.5% of GDP if the debt does not exceed 60% of 
GDP) was taken (Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011). All Member States are expected to reach 
their MTOs, or to be heading towards them by adjusting their structural budgetary positions 
at a rate of 0.5% of GDP per year as a benchmark. 
Temporary deviation from the adjustment path to MTO allowed if: 
 implementation of major structural reforms with a verifiable impact on the long term 
sustainability of public finances – emphasis on pension reform 
 unusual event outside the control of the MS concerned with a major impact on its 
financial position 
 severe economic downturn for the euro area or the EU as a whole provided this does 
not endanger medium term fiscal sustainability. 
In the case of structural pension reforms introducing a multi-pillar system that includes a 
mandatory fully funded pillar, which have a direct negative impact on the general 
government deficit, the allowed deviation from the adjustment path to the MTO or the 
objective itself should reflect the amount of the direct incremental impact of the reform on 
the general government balance, provided that an appropriate safety margin with respect to 
the deficit reference value is preserved. 
A new fiscal rule - expenditure rule - has been added. The rule imposes a limit on the growth 
rate of public expenditures (excluding expenditures on servicing public debt, expenditures 
financed from EU funds and cyclical expenditures on unemployment) depending on the level 
of public debt and actual fiscal position in relation to the MTO. 
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The introduction of the expenditure rule comes as the result of the assessment of Member 
States' fiscal policy after a period of good times. In 2007, only seven of them reached the 
MTO, including Sweden and Denmark, which do not belong to the euro zone. As 
demonstrated by research carried out by the European Commission, the main reason for not 
having achieved the MTO by individual countries was the excessive increase in public 
spending in the years 1998-2006. 
For the euro area countries sanctions for the conduct of fiscal policy with significant 
deviation from the MTOs were introduced, which previously was not the case (Regulation 
(EU) No 1173/2011. 
Significant changes have been introduced in the corrective arm of SGP (Regulation (EU) No 
1177/2011). First of all, public debt rule has been operationalized and a minimum step 
towards the reduction of public debt in relation to the level of 1/20 (the excess of debt over 
60% of GDP) on average over the last 3 years has been established. As regards to the 
benchmark for debt reduction a three-year transition period has been introduced for countries 
that on 8 November 2011 were subject to excessive deficit procedure 23 Member States. 
The net costs of pension reforms when assessing the balance of GGS shall be maintained 
considering that the reform supports long-term sustainability of public finances without 
increasing the risk for the budgetary position in the medium term (additionally, the debt must 
be below the reference value), and if the actual deficit is close to the reference value. 
A uniform standard for the presentation of information and data (actual and projected in the 
convergence and stability programs) together with an indication of the guidelines for 
macroeconomic assumptions has been introduced. As a part of the required information are 
the forecasts for long-term fiscal sustainability by identifying age-related expenditures. These 
should be in line with forecasts prepared by the AWG (currently published of 2015). 
Countries may, but are not obliged to present forecasts representing adjustments after the 
introduction of structural reform in any of the areas taken into account. For example, the 
Polish Convergence Programme of 2014 mentions 'pension reform' of 2013, with an 
indication that it will contribute to the improvement of the measures of long-term 
sustainability of public finances, giving no further details. 
The other regulations implemented during the reform of economic governance pose new 
requirements for MS’s fiscal policies. For example, the fiscal compact, being a part of the 
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Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (obliges member states to enshrine 
medium-term budgetary objectives into national law and to set the limit for structural deficits 
at 0.5% of GDP (rising to 1% in exceptional circumstances). 
6.3. Recommendations for the change of fiscal rules in the EU 
The reform of economic governance and strengthening the fiscal surveillance in the EU 
member states carried out during 2011-2013, has removed to some extent the instruments that 
could discourage Member States to introduce or continue pension reforms with the multi-
pillar approach. However, we see the need for further changes. 
We propose the following: 
1. The change in determining MTO: the cost of pension reform should be fully taken 
into account: current regulations lack of symmetry – there is a partial upholding of public 
spending associated with age possible, but without taking into account the loss of government 
revenue due to their transfer to the mandatory pension funds. 
2. The evaluation of the GG sector deficit (under the excessive deficit procedure) should 
fully consider the cost of pension reform, even if it leads to excess of the reference value. The 
present method of treatment of pension reform costs is pro-cyclical and does not support 
long-term economic growth and fiscal sustainability. 
The latest declaration of the European Commission (European Commission, 2015), which 
encourage effective implementation of structural reforms and promote investment 
(specifically in context of the new European Fund for Strategic Investment) provides 
opportunities to reconsider fiscal rule in the EU regulations.  
Following our proposal, the calculation of the MTO could be based on the following rule:  
𝑀𝑇𝑂 = max(𝑀𝑇𝑂𝐼𝐿𝐷,𝑀𝑇𝑂𝑀𝐵, 𝑀𝑇𝑂𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜 𝐸𝑅𝑀2⁄ ) − ⁡𝑇𝐶 
 
where TC is the level of contributions transferred to mandatory funded part of the pension 
system in the year before (alternatively, this could be an average of several years prior to 
MTO calculation, i.e. three to five years).  
Comparison of the 2015 MTOs values with the suggested change is presented in Figure 6.1. 
Inclusion of the transition costs in the level of MTO increases the fiscal space for all 
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countries that have their mandatory multi-pillar pension systems to a level from 0.9% of GDP 
in Estonia to 2.4% of GDP in Latvia.  
Figure 6. 1. Simulation of change in the MTO level according to the proposed change (% GDP) 
 
Note: transition costs for latest available information: for BG and SK: based on 2011 level, for EE, LV and LT 
based on AWG 2015 report, for PL national data for 2014. 
Source: Stability and Convergence Programmes 2015 of analysed countries and authors’ calculations. 
Concurrently according to our second proposal, transition costs (TC) should be fully 
accounted for during the assessment of the fiscal position at the EDP procedure. Full 
consideration of TC in the limit of the GG deficit leads to an increased threshold for countries 
that have made a higher fiscal effort due to the introduction of multi-pillar pension scheme. 
The results of the simulation, presented in Figure 6.2, indicates that in times of economic 
crisis in some countries (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania) excessive deficit procedures could be 
implemented later and would not demand so strong fiscal consolidation during the recession.  
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Figure 6. 2. Simulation of limit of fiscal position at the EDP procedure with transition cost fully accounted 
for (% GDP). 
  
Note: transition costs for latest available information: for BG and SK: based on 2012 level, for EE, LV and LT 
based on AWG 2015 report, for PL national data for 2014. 
Source: Author’ simulations. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusions 
Kamila Bielawska, Agnieszka Chłoń-Domińczak, Dariusz Stańko 
 
In this chapter we present a short synthesis of findings in the report, from the perspective of 
the initial hypotheses that were formulated in the introduction. 
Hypothesis 1: Rise of the public debt and fiscal deficit in the CEE countries was not 
primarily caused by the costs of financing transition to funded pension systems. 
The overview of socio-economic and fiscal situation as well as performance of pension funds 
in the mandatory part of the multi-pillar scheme, presented in the report indicates that there 
are many differences in all of the analysed areas between the eight CEE countries taken into 
account. Each of these factors, alongside the political economy, in theory had a contribution 
to the sustainability of pension systems during the times of the economic crisis as well as in 
the long run. Table 7.1 presents the summary of potential impact of the analysed factors on 
decisions on pension reform reversals or reductions.  
Table 7. 1. Summary: social, economic and fiscal context of pension reform reversals 
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Pension system 
changes after 
crisis 
Bulgaria - - + + + - - + No change 
Estonia - - + + + - + + 
Temporary 
reduction with 
offset 
Latvia -- -- - - - - -- - Partial reduction 
Lithuania - - -- + + - -- - Partial reduction 
Hungary -- - - -- - + - -- 
Permanent 
reversal 
Poland -- -- ++ -- - + -- -- 
Permanent 
reduction and 
partial reversal 
Slovakia -- -- ++ - - - -- -- 
Permanent 
reduction 
Source: Authors’ analysis. 
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Countries with the smallest changes in pension systems – Bulgaria and Estonia indeed have 
the most favourable situation when we look at the overall outcome, including most 
importantly low levels of government debt and deficit, but also stable or declining pension 
expenditure and rising employment levels. Countries that followed most radical reversals or 
reductions – Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic – have the worst public finance 
indicators, but also their demographic outlook shows fast population ageing and current 
pension expenditure puts additional fiscal pressure, despite relatively favourable employment 
level as well as performance of the funded pillar.  
This comparison indicates that indeed the fiscal situation is one of the strongest drivers 
behind decisions on stepping back from initial multi-pillar pension reforms. The lesson from 
experiences of CEE countries is that a weak political consensus on reform priorities and a 
lack of strong national fiscal rules dilute the initial concept of financing the transition cost. As 
a result, rising fiscal pressure leads to decisions to scale down or effectively eliminate the 
multi-pillar approach and return to pension financing based fully or predominantly on PAYG 
basis.   
Hypothesis 2: The way the CEE countries governments justified cuts in pension funds 
contributions can threaten the social trust to mandatory pension systems. 
The governments in their decisions to permanently reverse from the funded system frequently 
used arguments related to the poor performance of pension funds. As our analysis shows in 
the case of the two countries that had the most far-reaching reversals: Hungary (elimination 
of the funded system) and Poland (maintaining small funded part in accumulation phase 
based on voluntary participation) also had the highest real rates of return, exceeding GDP 
growth. Both in Hungary and Poland, after the changes in mandatory system, participation in 
the voluntary schemes did not increase significantly. This may indicate that the voluntary 
savings did not replace the loss caused by the reduction of assets in the mandatory funded 
scheme.  
Hypothesis 3: Short-term effects of reduction of contributions to pension funds were 
positive for public finance and did not have a negative impact on pension systems, but may 
lead to increased volatility of financial markets. 
Fast fiscal consolidation, carried out both on revenue and expenditure side, including changes 
in the funded pillars of pension system in analysed countries, brought the fiscal position to 
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the required levels (all of the studied countries came out of the excessive deficit procedure as 
for fiscal year 2014). Given the relatively short period of time that passed after the changes in 
the pension system were introduced, we cannot verify the impact of the change on the 
financial markets volatility.  
Hypothesis 4: Future pension benefits will be lower due to reduction of contributions 
transferred to mandatory pension funds. 
The results of microsimulations presented in the report indicate that the level of pension 
benefits will change differently in all countries. Only in Poland workers can expect losses in 
pension wealth. In this country pension savings on financial markets were replaced by GDP-
indexed NDC account, and under the long-run assumptions accumulated pension wealth will 
be lower, unless the changes in the design of the funded pension system would lead to the 
systemic penalty due to the design inefficiencies. On the other hand, the design of the pension 
system in Slovakia leads to higher levels of pension wealth. Results of the microsimulations 
are also in line with the OECD projections (OECD, 2013). The level of PAYG benefits is 
expected to be higher in Slovakia, while in the Baltic countries the change does not lead to a 
significant change in expected pension level. Thus, the research evidence only partially 
supports this hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 5: Future stability of pension systems and public finance will worsen due to 
reduction of contributions to mandatory pension funds. 
Long-term projections of pension systems prepared by the member states and published in 
the Ageing Reports show that only in Poland the level of public pension expenditure 
according to the 2015 projections will be higher compared to previous reports, which can be 
attributed to the shift of the funded contribution to the public system. In other CEE countries, 
the level of pension expenditure in 2060 projected in 2015 will be lower than projected three 
years before. This indicates that other changes to the PAYG systems, such as modifications 
of benefit formulae or rising retirement ages contribute to increasing sustainability of pension 
systems. While the result of the change of the level of contributions may have contributed to 
the increase in the pension spending, other parallel changes, such as raising retirement age 
levels, reduces this effect. There is no available evidence that could allow for the assessment 
of the marginal effect of the change related to the reduction of the fully funded pension 
system parts.  
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Changes to the funded pillar of pension systems helped to improve the fiscal stability 
measured by S1 and S2 indicators in analysed countries, both in the medium and long term. 
However, it should be noted that in most of the CEE countries, the effect of the increase in 
public pension expenditures related to the acquisition of all or a part of the contribution from 
the second pillar will emerge in the years beyond the forecast horizon (after 2060). The 2015 
Ageing Report supports the European Commission preliminary assessment of S1 and S2 
indicators as of 2014. The forthcoming Fiscal Sustainability Report (2015) should reflect 
positive changes in public finances stability at least over 2060 horizon. 
Hypothesis 6: A compromise between solving fiscal tensions and maintaining a significant 
role of mandatory funded pillars would have to involve considerable changes in the fiscal 
rules in the EU, the Eurostat classification methods of pension debt and countries internal 
public finance laws. 
The reform of economic governance and strengthening the fiscal surveillance in the EU 
member states carried out during 2011-2013, has removed some instruments that could 
discourage Member States to introduce or continue pension reforms with the multi-pillar 
approach. However, the changes in the fiscal rules were applied after most of the analysed 
countries decided to retreat or permanent reduce the role of funded pillar in financing future 
pensions. Further changes to the fiscal rules are needed to fit the challenges of ageing 
populations. This report proposes the new rules that would strike the balance between the 
need for observance the fiscal discipline and the necessity for securing diversified source of 
future retirement income. 
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Annex. Socio-economic context of pension systems  
 
Pension system reform is an on-going phenomenon, which has a wider socio-economic 
context. In this section we present and discuss the changes in the areas of demographic 
developments, labour market performance as well as current pension systems development, 
including the number of pensioners and pension expenditure after 2000.  These developments 
have an impact both on current financial situation of pension systems and on the future 
sustainability of pensions.  
A.1. Demographic developments. 
 
Demographic developments are important mainly from the long-term perspective. Reforms 
were triggered by observed very low fertility rates as well as rising life expectancies. The 
economic transition triggered sharp declines in fertility. However, some demographers 
(Bongaarts 2001 and 2002) and Sobotka (2004) both suggested that lowest-low fertility was a 
transient phenomenon, which they expected to end soon. The majority of official population 
projections followed this view, projecting increases in lowest-low fertility from observed 
levels under 1.3 children per woman to levels above 1.5. (Goldstein, Sobotka, Jasilioniene, 
2009) support this argument, indicating that the bulk of evidence to date points to a recovery 
of period fertility well above lowest-low levels, which may help to maintain the sustainable 
level of demographic dependency rates in the future. If we look at fertility levels after 2000, 
we can divide the 8 CEE countries into two groups (see Figure A.1). In Latvia, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania and Slovak Republic, fertility rate after 2000 remained at a low level, 
ranging from 1.2 to 1.4, significantly below EU average. This translates into rising risk of 
declining labour force in the future. Furthermore, after the hit of the financial crisis, the 
fertility rates dropped in this group of countries (with exception of Slovak Republic) again 
below the lowest-low level of 1.3. In three remaining countries: Bulgaria, Estonia and 
Lithuania, fertility increased to the level at or above EU average. However again, after the 
crisis, fertility rates dropped in Estonia and Bulgaria.  
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Figure A. 1. Fertility rates in CEE countries, 2000-2011 
 
 
Source: EUROSTAT, extracted in December 2013.  
Simultaneously, average life expectancy increased (see Figure A.2). This means that people 
live longer lives, including the period spent on retirement. Between 2000 and 2012 life 
expectancy at 65 increased on average by 1.7 years (ranging from increase of 2.8 years in 
Estonia to around 1 year in Lithuania). These increases were partially off-set by increases of 
retirement age, as presented in previous section. However, modest increases of retirement age 
did not compensate fully the longer life expectancy at age 65.  
After the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007, increased emigration from the CEE countries 
also had an impact on the size of their labour forces. Okólski (2007, p. 14) points out the 
increased mobility of citizens of several countries who before their accession hardly figured 
in European migration statistics. Migrant workers registered in the three EU15 countries that 
immediately opened their labour markets to the citizens of EU8 constituted a considerable 
fraction of the potential workforce of the donor countries.  
A similar pattern occurred after the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. In 2008 
Romanians and Bulgarians were in the top three of the most mobile nationals in Europe 
(Rolfe et al., 2013).  
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Figure A. 2. Average life expectancy at age 65 (total for men and women) 
 
Source: EUROSTAT, extracted in December 2013. 
According to the European Commission estimates in 2012 migrants accounted for 14 per cent 
of the working age population in Romania, more than 10 per cent in Lithuania and around 8 
per cent in Latvia and Bulgaria (Figure A.3). The World Bank (2006, p. 29) underlines that 
the increased migration has several short and long-term consequences, such increasing wage 
pressure that in turn reinforces inflationary pressures. High emigration can also gradually 
slow output growth and place a greater burden on domestic workers to care for their nations’ 
ageing populations. 
Demographic projections show expected increases of old-age dependency rate, particularly in 
the countries with low fertility levels. This is the result of presented demographic processes 
and changes in the age structure of population. According to the Eurostat population 
projections, the current dependency rate will more than double in all of the countries by 2060 
(Figure A.4).  
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Figure A. 3. Mobility rates by sending country — mobile EU citizens living in another EU Member State, 
by years of residence (age group 15-64, 2013, in % of working-age population of country of citizenship) 
 
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat-EU-Labour Force Survey  
(http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/themes/27_skills_gaps_and_labour_mobility_02.pdf) 
 
Figure A. 4. Current and projected demographic dependency rate (people age 65+ per 100 people in age 
18-64) 
 
Source: EUROSTAT demographic projection (EUROPOP 2011). 
Overall, demographic developments after 2000 still indicate that the CEE countries have to 
make significant effort to adjust to the demographic change. Additional, not foreseen, 
developments related to post-accession increased migration flows led to a decrease of 
potential labour force remaining in the country.  
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A.2 Labour market 
 
Upon implementation of pension reforms, projections scenarios also assumed relative growth 
of the employment that in turn led to higher expected inflows of contributions needed to 
finance the current PAYG expenditure. These higher inflows would help to bridge the 
increased financing gap caused by diverting part of contributions to funded tiers. Again, in 
reality these expectations were not fully met (see: Figure A.5A). 
In cases of Romania and Hungary before the economic crisis (2000-2008), employment 
declined or remained at the 2000 level. Poland and Lithuania experienced modest growth, 
while in the case of Bulgaria, Latvia and Estonia, employment growth ranged between 15 and 
20 per cent. After 2008 employment decreased, especially in Baltic States and Bulgaria. 
Overall, between 2000 and 2011 employment declined in Romania, Lithuania, Latvia and 
Hungary and increased modestly in Slovak Republic, Poland, Estonia and Bulgaria (Figure 
A.5B). 
Figure A. 5. Employment changes in 8 CEE countries, 2000-2011 
A. Employment level (2000=100) B. Total change in employment between 2000, 2008 
and 2011  
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EUROSTAT.  
The labour market changes did not support pension reforms implementation in CEE countries 
as initially expected. Modest growth or decline in the number of people employed mean that 
pension contribution revenue in the PAYG part was lower than expected by reformers, 
causing larger than expected current deficits in pension financing.  
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A.3. Pensioners and pension expenditure 
 
Last but not least, the current pension system situation is also an important factor that affects 
the implementation of pension reforms. As noted in the first part, the countries expected to 
finance part of their transition costs from reduced pension expenditure. This reduction was to 
follow parametric or paradigmatic shifts in their pension systems. However, if we look at the 
actual performance, the level of PAYG pension expenditure remained relatively constant 
after 2000, ranging from around 5 per cent of GDP in Estonia to around 10 per cent of GDP 
in Poland. After 2008 in many countries pension expenditure in relation to GDP increased, 
which is related to relatively stable nominal level of pension expenditure combined with 
observed recession and GDP decline (Figure A.6A).  
Figure A. 6 Old-age pension expenditure in CEE countries, 2000-2011 
A. Pension expenditure as % of GDP b. Total change in pension expenditure, between 2000 
and 2011  (% of GDP) 
 
 
Note: In Bulgaria the initial year of comparison is 2006, due to the limitations of the ESPROSS database. 
Source: EUROSTAT Espross Database. 
Estonia, Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania successfully implemented and executed laws on 
rationalisation of PAYG expenditure. This also translated in reduced pension expenditure 
between 2000 and 2007. Between 2008 and 2012 the ratio of pension expenditure to GDP 
increased again in 7 countries (with exception of Poland). In Hungary and Romania pension 
expenditure increased both in pre-crisis and after crisis periods.  
Drop in pension expenditure in Estonia is partly explained by the actual drop in number of 
old-age pensioners. Comparable data, available in Eurostat statistics from 2006 shows that in 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Romania the number of old-age pensioners did not change 
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significantly, while in Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic the actual number of 
old-age pensioners increased (Figure A.7).  
Figure A. 7. Changes in the number of old-age pensioners in 8 CEE countries (2007=100). 
  
Source: EUROSTAT Espross Database. 
The rise of the pension expenditure after 2008 was one of the reasons behind the reduction of 
fully funded contribution levels. The contribution revenue, relative to GDP increased after 
2007 in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. We also observe an increase in 
contribution revenue in Poland between 2013 and 2010. Only in Lithuania we observe 
decline of contribution revenue compared to GDP.  
Figure A. 8. Pension contribution revenue in the analysed countries (% of GDP), 2007-2013 
A. Contribution revenue, 2007-2013 B. Pension expenditure and contribution revenue in 
2013 
  
Source: (European Commission DG ECFIN, 2009, 2012, 2015). 
However, as shown in Figure A.8B, in all of the countries, there is a difference between 
contribution revenue and pension expenditure. The contribution revenue does not cover the 
pension system spending. The largest differences are seen in Poland, Romania and Bulgaria.  
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Changes in PAYG pension systems, implemented in the 8 CEE countries did not lead to 
actual savings in pension expenditure that could support pension reform implementation. The 
level of pension expenditure in relation to GDP in 2012 exceeded the one observed in 2000, 
mainly due to increases in pension-to-GDP spending after 2008 in 6 countries (with 
exception of Bulgaria and Latvia). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
